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The Authoritarianization of U.S. 
Counterterrorism 
Sahar F. Aziz* 
[W]e will not hesitate to take decisive action. We will always do 
so legally, discriminately, proportionally, and bound by strict 
accountability and strong oversight. The United States—not 
our adversaries—will define the nature and scope of this 
struggle, lest it define us.1  
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I. Introduction 
More than seventeen years since the “War on Terror” began, 
the United States has failed to recognize how its authoritarian 
allies, rather than its adversaries, have defined its 
counterterrorism practices. Western democracies have adopted 
signature practices of authoritarian regimes.2 Torture, secret 
renditions to black sites, indefinite detention, mass surveillance, 
targeted killings, selective anti-terrorism enforcement against 
dissidents and minorities, criminalization of political beliefs, and 
decreased due process rights are among the counterterrorism 
practices found in both the United States and their Middle East 
allies, albeit in varying degrees.3  
Human rights are de-coupled from security, or worse, treated 
as an impediment to preserving national security. Although the 
balance between security and liberty has been the topic of lively 
                                                                                                     
 2. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2004: HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
ARMED CONFLICT 140–46 (2004) (discussing the threat to individual rights); 
Jessica Wolfendale, Terrorism, Security, and the Threat of Counterterrorism, 29 
STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 753, 761–62 (2016) (noting the tactics of military 
dictatorships in South America who invoked the threat of internal and external 
terrorism to justify torture and extrajudicial killings); Sudha Setty, Country 
Report on Counterterrorism: United States of America, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 643, 644 
(2015) (describing the sweeping executive power to investigate and neutralize 
potential threats). 
 3. See ANTON DU PLESSIS, A SNAPSHOT OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
COOPERATION AGAINST TERRORISM SINCE 9/11 31–32 (Larissa van den Herrick & 
Nico Schrijver eds., 2013) (describing the extraordinary rendition program); 
SUSAN N. HERMAN, TAKING LIBERTIES: THE WAR OF TERROR AND THE EROSION OF 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 177 (2011) (noting targeting of Greenpeace by National 
Security Agency surveillance); LALEH KHALILI, TIME IN THE SHADOWS: 
CONFINEMENT IN COUNTERINSURGENCIES 58–64 (2013) (describing the rights 
infringing tactics deployed by the Israeli government against Palestinians). 
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debate since 9/11, I proffer that the impetus behind rights 
violations is not limited to perennial tensions between security and 
liberty in times of war. Increased international coordination in 
counterterrorism between authoritarian regimes and liberal 
democracies also adversely affects human rights. 
As terrorism crosses borders with ease, transnational 
counterterrorism has become a necessity.4 International 
organizations and states coordinate preventing terrorism, 
identifying and apprehending known terrorists, and prosecuting 
terrorism suspects between nations.5 One consequence of such 
coordination is the normalization of illiberal counterterrorism 
norms and practices common among democratic nations.6  
While coordinated counterterrorism is warranted to combat 
transnational terrorists, the current rights-subordinating 
approach is counterproductive.7 Western governments that engage 
in or directly support rights-infringing practices ultimately aid 
terrorists as they proclaim themselves legitimate defenders 
against transnational state violence.8 Aggressive state measures 
trigger backlash attacks as new grievances arise, thereby feeding 
a cycle of state and non-state violence at the expense of civilian 
lives.9 The challenge for Western democratic nations is to avoid a 
                                                                                                     
 4. See, e.g., Ayaz R. Shaikh, A Theoretic Approach to Transnational 
Terrorism, 80 GEO. L.J. 2131, 2157 (1992) (“[T]ransnational terrorism, by 
definition, involves the participation of more than one nation.”). But see TODD 
SANDLER ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM 2 (2008) (noting that Western nations’ 
view that transnational terrorism is a major threat is contradicted by the fact 
that approximately 1,249 people are killed from transnational terrorist attacks in 
comparison to 30,000 from annual highway accidents in the United States). 
 5. See Shaikh, supra note 4, at 2158–59 (stating the goals of international 
cooperation). The role of non-state actors in transnational terrorism further 
facilitates international cooperation. See Monika Heupel, Adapting to 
Transnational Terrorism: The UN Security Council’s Evolving Approach to 
Terrorism, 38 SECURITY DIALOGUE 477, 494–95 (2007) (emphasizing 
contemporary terrorism’s fluid territorial affiliation). 
 6. See infra Part IV (detailing the impact of counterterrorism coordination). 
 7. See Wolfendale, supra note 2, at 760 (noting the inadvertent 
consequences of Western counterterrorism). 
 8. See, e.g., DALIA DASSA KAYE ET AL., MORE FREEDOM, LESS TERROR? 
LIBERALIZATION AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN THE ARAB WORLD 13 (2008) (stating 
that United States support for authoritarian regimes unintentionally promoted 
extremism).  
 9. See SANDLER ET AL, supra note 4, at 2 (describing competing 
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race to the bottom in their counterterrorism coordination with 
authoritarian regimes.  
To be sure, the deplorable techniques used in the “War on 
Terror” did not originate solely in the authoritarian regimes of the 
Middle East and Central Asia.10 Such practices originated from 
colonial powers in Algeria, Palestine, and Afghanistan, and were 
subsequently adopted by new ruling elites post-independence.11 
The United States innovated other practices, such as rendition and 
targeted killings with drones.12 This Article, thus, explores the 
narrow issue of the impact on democratic states’ conformity with 
human rights arising from working with authoritarian states in 
the Middle East. Specifically, I proffer that counterterrorism 
coordination with dictatorships normalizes the use of violence and 
dehumanization of suspects by the U.S. government.13 As more 
agents work with foreign agents who operate in a legal and 
political context where rights are subordinate to authoritarian 
security practices, the toleration, aiding and abetting, or direct 
violations of human rights may rise as the institutional culture of 
an agency shifts towards a more authoritarian mentality. 
The adverse consequences of this drift away from liberal 
principles are not limited to the subordination of individual rights. 
Security interests are also compromised. Terrorists astutely 
exploit state violence and rights violations to legitimize their 
                                                                                                     
considerations for liberal democracies responding to transnational terrorism). 
 10. See KHALILI, supra note 3, at 7–10 (showing the historical roots of the 
post-9/11 detention and torture of terrorism suspect in the racialized 
manipulation of law by European and American governments to repress colonized 
people). 
 11. See id. at 7 (describing mass slaughter as a routine colonial warfare 
technique).  
 12. See Mary Ellen O’Connell, When Are Drone Killings Illegal?, CNN, 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/15/opinion/oconnell-targeted-killing/index.html 
(last updated Aug. 16, 2012) (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (describing the 
development of the drone program) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 13. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST MASS 
SURVEILLANCE 39–45 (2005) (detailing the normalization of rendition, torture, and 
death); HELEN DUFFY, THE ‘WAR ON TERROR’ AND THE FRAMEWORK OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 548–50 (2d ed. 2015) (critiquing international 
counterterrorism coordination as marginalizing human rights). 
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claims as defenders of justice against state oppression.14 Terrorist 
recruiters point to the wide net of suspicion and prosecution cast 
upon Muslim minorities as evidence of the state’s illegitimacy.15 
Such trends are consistent with some scholars’ findings that 
human rights abuses may correlate with terrorism.16 
Prescriptively, I recommend that financial and legal 
restrictions should be imposed on U.S. intelligence and security 
agencies’ collaboration with authoritarian regimes with a track 
record of rights violations in their counterterrorism practices. 
Existing legal restrictions on the delivery of U.S. foreign aid to 
countries that violate human rights should be expanded to 
encompass financial support and coordination in 
counterterrorism.17 Put simply, U.S. security agencies should be 
                                                                                                     
 14. See, e.g., Sahar F. Aziz, Losing the ‘War of Ideas’: A Critique of 
Countering Violent Extremism Programs, 52 TEX. INT’L L.J. 255, 261–62 (2017) 
(arguing that narratives of oppression and injustice work to recruit vulnerable 
individuals). 
 15. See, e.g., Wolfendale, supra note 2, at 763 (noting that the majority of 
people arrested for terrorism in Britain are Muslim although the majority 
actually convicted are non-Muslim). But see James A. Piazza & James Igoe Walsh, 
Transnational Terror and Human Rights, 53 INT’L STUD. Q. 125, 129 (2009) 
(challenging the normative claim that “transnational terrorist attacks lead 
governments to restrict rights with the objective of improving security”). 
 16. See James I. Walsh & James A. Piazza, Why Respecting Physical 
Integrity Rights Reduces Terrorism, 43 COMP. POL. STUD. 551, 556 (2010) (arguing 
that government violations of physical integrity promote terrorism). But see 
Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Jacob N. Shapiro, Tortured Relations: Human Rights 
Abuses and Counterterrorism Cooperation, 43 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 415, 419 (2010) 
(noting that further research is needed to determine if human rights restrictions 
are counterproductive to international counterterrorism goals). 
 17. See NINA M. SERAFINO ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43361, “LEAHY 
LAW” HUMAN RIGHTS PROVISIONS AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE: ISSUE OVERVIEW 1 
(2014)  
Section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 . . . prohibits the 
furnishing of assistance authorized by the FAA and the Arms Export 
Control Act . . . to any foreign security force unit that is credibly 
believed to have committed a gross violation of human rights. The 
other provision, inserted annually in DOD appropriations legislation, 
for years prohibited the use of DOD funds to support any training 
program (as defined by DOD) involving members of a unit of foreign 
security or police force if the unit had committed a gross violation of 
human rights. For FY2014, the prohibition has been expanded to also 
include “equipment, or other assistance.” 
See also Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortensen, United States Adjusts Aid 
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restrained in the degree to which they can cooperate with countries 
that violate human rights in counterterrorism.  
This Article looks to the authoritarian practices of Egypt, one 
of the United States’ major allies, as a case study. Having long 
practiced torture, indefinite detention, trial of civilians in military 
courts, and other human rights violations, Egypt was a 
destination, among other nations, of terrorism suspects in the U.S. 
extraordinary rendition program.18  
In comparing the United States’ counterterrorism practices 
with Egypt’s, the authoritarianization effect of coordination is 
brought to the forefront. Specifically, American national security 
policies and practices post-9/11 have become rights-infringing in 
ways that mirror those of Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes, 
and their predecessor colonial powers.19 Hawkish U.S. government 
national security rhetoric and fear mongering translates into fewer 
civil liberties and more human rights violations—first for Muslims 
and eventually for the American public at large.20 Ranging from 
the extreme practices of torture, indefinite detention, and targeted 
assassinations to prosecutions that deny defendants’ due process, 
habeas corpus, and confrontation rights, America’s 
counterterrorism practices in the “War on Terror” are troublingly 
similar to those of their authoritarian partners.21  
II. Theorizing the Causes of Terrorism 
For centuries, people have fought asymmetrical wars against 
sovereign nations in pursuit of political, social, economic, and 
religious goals.22 The conflicts are often grounded in local 
                                                                                                     
to Egypt in Light of Legal and Political Developments, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 644, 648 
(2015) (describing the Leahy Act and restrictions on foreign aid to countries with 
human rights violations).  
 18. See DANIEL BYMAN, THE FIVE FRONT WAR: THE BETTER WAY TO FIGHT 
GLOBAL JIHAD 165 (2008) (detailing Egypt’s authoritarian practices). 
 19. See KHALILI, supra note 3, at 14–16 (describing repressive colonial 
practices). 
 20. See, e.g., Wolfendale, supra note 2, at 754 (“[T]he fear of terrorism is as 
much a product of counterterrorism rhetoric as it is of terrorism itself.”). 
 21. See infra Part IV.B (detailing human rights violations in Egypt).  
 22. See, e.g., SANDLER ET AL., supra note 4, at 1 (detailing terrorist campaigns 
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grievances against the ruler, ruling elites, and external powerful 
actors.23 The surge in international travel, trade, and migration 
has expanded the reach of terrorist groups.24 Access to the internet, 
social media, and other technological advancements provides 
ample opportunity for non-state actors to recruit and perpetuate 
violence transnationally.25 As a result, the constrictive effects of 
state borders are dissipating while asymmetrical conflicts between 
state and non-state actors surge.26  
To effectively counter transnational terrorism, policy makers 
look to what causes individuals to use violence in pursuit of their 
aims. This central question has triggered lively debates among 
scholars and policy makers.27 Among the cacophony of competing 
                                                                                                     
from 48 A.D. through the current era of transnational terrorism).  
 23. See RICHARD JACKSON ET AL., TERRORISM: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 18 
(2011) (noting that violent Islamist groups in the contemporary era pursue 
grievances in their local and national contexts); FRANÇOIS BURGAT, ISLAMISM IN 
THE SHADOW OF AL-QAEDA 40–41 (Patrick Hutchison trans., 2008) (noting that the 
Arab governing elite are devoid of public support). 
 24. See SANDLER ET AL., supra note 4, at 1 (listing the high-profile 
transnational terrorist attacks in the three decades prior to 9/11). 
 25. See Quan Li & Drew Schaub, Economic Globalization and Transnational 
Terrorism: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis, 48 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 230, 249 (2004) 
(noting that terrorists want to be heard and watched by large audiences, and thus 
seek out media attention); JESSICA STERN & J.M. BERGER, ISIS: THE STATE OF 
TERROR 124, 172–73 (2015) (describing ISIS’s electronic army that used social 
media to spread its propaganda and recruit); Edward Marks & Michael B. Kraft, 
The Evolving Terrorist Threat from Nixon to Trump, AM. DIPLOMACY (2017) 
http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2017/0106/ca/markskraft_counterterr.h
tml (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (describing terrorist groups’ sophisticated use of 
the internet for recruiting) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 26. See Piazza & Walsh, supra note 15, at 127 (explaining that terrorist 
groups adopt strategies to compensate for controlling fewer material resources 
than governments); RONALD CRELINSTEN, COUNTERTERRORISM 3 (2009) (noting 
that terrorist groups require less infrastructure than government actors). But see 
Alex Braithwaite & Quan Li, Transnational Terrorism Hot Spots: Identification 
and Impact Evaluation, 24 CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI. 281, 289 (2007) (“[A]ll 
else being equal, if a country is located within a hot-spot neighborhood, it is likely 
to experience more future terrorist incidents than another country that does not 
currently belong to such a neighborhood.”). 
 27. See, e.g., Katerina Dalacoura, Democracy as Counter-Terrorism in the 
Middle East: A Red Herring?, 8 ULUSLARARASI İLIŞKILER 101, 103–06 (2012) 
(describing political and socioeconomic factors driving Islamist terrorism); 
CRELINSTEN, supra note 26, at 2 (examining how terrorist groups choose victims 
of violent attacks). 
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theories, two schools of thought have emerged that inform 
counterterrorism policies and practices.28 The first argues that 
political and socioeconomic factors such as poverty, 
authoritarianism, human rights violations, political repression, an 
absence of the rule of law, and inequality contribute to political 
violence by non-state actors.29 The second argues ideological 
factors such as religious fundamentalism, anti-capitalism, 
Marxism, xenophobia, hyper-nationalism, or racism drive political 
violence.30 The school of thought followed by a particular country 
influences its counterterrorism strategy. The first school of 
thought leads to a development and rights-based approach and the 
second leads to a militarized approach. Although the United States 
pays lip service to the political and socioeconomic factors that 
contribute to terrorism, its counterterrorism strategies and 
practices follow the militarized approach.31 
The development-focused approach connects violence and 
militancy to poor development indicators such as illiteracy, 
poverty, rootlessness, poor governance, and rights abuses by the 
state.32 Grievances arising from such conditions fester to push 
                                                                                                     
 28. See KATERINA DALACOURA, ISLAMIST TERRORISM AND DEMOCRACY IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST 24–25 (2011) (noting ideational, material, and structural causes of 
terrorism). 
 29. See Li & Schaub, supra note 25, at 237 (posing multiple critiques of 
Kruger and Malečková’s 2002 study that found no correlation between poverty 
and terrorism at the individual level in Hezbollah suicide missions); Dalacoura, 
supra note 27, at 103 (arguing that materialist or structural factors drive Islamic 
terrorism because ideas are epiphenomenal to the underlying reasons). 
 30. See CRELINSTEN, supra note 26, at 196–97 (listing the ideological 
influences); see also ALAN KRUEGER, WHAT MAKES A TERRORIST: ECONOMICS AND 
THE ROOTS OF TERRORISM (2007) (arguing that the rich are as likely as the poor to 
participate in terrorist acts); Quan Li, Does Democracy Promote or Reduce 
Transnational Terrorist Incidents?, 49 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 278, 294 (2005) 
(“[D]emocratic participation reduces transnational terrorist incidents in a 
country. Government constraints, subsuming the effect of press freedom, increase 
the number of terrorist incidents in a country.”). 
 31. See infra Part III (discussing the authoritarianism present in United 
States counterterrorism). 
 32. See, e.g., Dalacoura, supra note 27, at 103 (discussing political effects of 
an authoritarian regime); see also Owen Frazer & Christian Nünlist, The Concept 
of Countering Violent Extremism, 183 CSS ANALYSIS IN SECURITY POL’Y 1, 3 (2015) 
(arguing that countering violent extremism programs should also address 
structural causes of terrorism, such as intolerance and political, economic, or 
social marginalization); Edward Newman, Exploring the “Root Causes” of 
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indigenous groups into violently opposing the state and becoming 
recruits for foreign terrorist groups.33 Although the majority of 
poor people are not terrorists, poverty combined with structural 
inequalities may facilitate terrorism recruitment.34 Relatedly, 
rapid urbanization coupled with bulges of educated youth unable 
to find employment commensurate with their education may 
explain why middle and upper middle class individuals join 
terrorist groups.35 When democratic processes are not equally 
accessible to all residents or rule of law is selectively enforced to 
the detriment of marginalized groups, violence becomes an 
attractive means to effectuate change.36 
A study of sixty-one “Islamic extremist terrorists” in the 
United States, for example, found most of the suspects were at the 
margins of society.37 Many were friendless, petty criminals, drug 
addicts, from broken homes, or suffering a personal identity 
crisis.38 Few of the would-be terrorists sought to spread Islam or 
establish a caliphate. Instead, they saw themselves as defenders of 
their religion against what they perceived as America’s war on 
Islam.39 The American citizen who attempted to bomb Times 
                                                                                                     
Terrorism, 29 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 749, 750 (2006) (explaining tactics 
used by terrorists to recruit new members to support their cause). 
 33. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 8, at 45–46 (discussing socioeconomic factors 
that make individuals susceptible to terrorist group recruitment); Bassam Tibi, 
Religious Extremism or Religionization of Politics: The Ideological Foundations of 
Political Islam, in RADICAL ISLAM AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: CHALLENGES AND 
RESPONSES 93–94 (Efraim Inbar & Hillel Frisch eds., 2007) (arguing that high 
unemployment rates and social marginalization among North African Muslim 
youth in France have made them more sympathetic to violent Islamist groups). 
 34. See CRELINSTEN, supra note 26, at 198 (noting economic factors driving 
terrorism). For an analysis examining how counterterrorism programming also 
disparately impacts poor and working-class communities in the United States, 
see generally Khaled A. Beydoun, Between Indigence, Islamophobia, and Erasure: 
Poor and Muslim in “War on Terror” America, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 1463 (2016).   
 35. See DALACOURA, supra note 28, at 34 (describing how recruitment spans 
across various socioeconomic classes). 
 36. See BYMAN, supra note 18, at 191 (noting the impact of a lack of 
democratic process). 
 37. See John Mueller & Mark G. Stewart, Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and 
the Internet: The American Cases, 8 DYNAMICS ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 176, 177 
(2015) (examining the “radicalization” process of potential terrorists). 
 38. See id. (noting that many in the study could not keep employment). 
 39. See id. (describing that potential terrorists are motivated by revenge).  
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Square in 2010 admitted to being motivated by the United States 
terrorizing Muslim people and Muslim countries through drone 
strikes, among other practices.40 Ironically, the more the U.S. 
government imputes a criminal connotation to the term “Islamist,” 
the more members of terrorist organizations believe their violent 
acts are a form of legitimate revolt against state oppression.41 That 
is, calling terrorism “Islamist jihad” validates terrorist groups’ 
propaganda that America is at war with Islam.42 
Armed conflict also correlates with terrorism. The Global 
Terrorism Index found that state violence and the presence of an 
armed conflict are closely associated with terrorist activity.43 Over 
a twenty-five year span, 92% of terrorist attacks occurred where 
state violence was prevalent.44 In contrast, fewer than 0.6% of 
terrorist attacks occurred in states without conflict or state 
violence.45 Predictably, failed states are a magnet for terrorist 
groups to set up bases from which to launch domestic and 
transnational attacks.46 Indeed, the Middle Eastern countries of 
Iraq, Syria, and Libya with governments who lack a monopoly over 
the use of force are now hosts to branches of Al Qaeda, ISIS, and 
other transnational terrorist groups.47 
Taking stock of this data, the Bush Administration made 
democracy promotion the defining component of its post-9/11 
                                                                                                     
 40. See id. at 178 (detailing a desire to be part of the solution to U.S. attacks).  
 41. See BURGAT, supra note 23, at 8 (discussing the impact of the American 
narrative on terror). 
 42. See Aziz, supra note 14, at 261 (describing the recruiting narrative of 
violent American military intervention and support of dictators).  
 43. See INST. FOR ECON. & PEACE, GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2015 68 (2015) 
(describing contributing factors such as armed conflict, conflict within the 
country, and corruption). 
 44. See id. at 70 (“92 percent of all terrorist attacks occurred in countries 
where the Political Terror Scale was very high.”). 
 45. See id. at 68 (emphasizing the link between terrorism and state security); 
see also Li & Schaub, supra note 25, at 242 (finding that countries with a history 
of terrorist activities have more terrorist incidents than those without a history 
of terrorism). 
 46. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 8, at 25 (arguing that a lack of state 
legitimacy bolsters support for terrorists as defenders against state injustice). 
 47. See Heupel, supra note 5, at 481 (stating that terrorist groups turned to 
failing states instead of relying on state-provided safe havens); Walsh & Piazza, 
supra note 16, at 533 (discussing terrorist groups’ strategy for growth). 
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Freedom Agenda, thereby continuing America’s long history of 
spreading democracy as a mainstay of its foreign policy.48 The U.S. 
National Security Strategy in 2006, 2010, and 2015 all 
acknowledge that for democracy to exist, civil liberties, minority 
rights, and equality of all citizens must be preserved.49 The U.S. 
strategy rhetorically commits to using “economic assistance, 
development aid, trade, and good governance” to support new 
democracies.50 By promoting democracy in Muslim majority 
countries, the U.S. government believed Western security also 
would be improved.51 But contrary to its rhetoric, the United 
States’ counterterrorism practices bred violence. 
The second school of thought attributes ideology as the cause 
of terrorism, ranging from ethno-nationalism, separatism, 
anarchism, anti-capitalism, neoliberalism, and religious 
fundamentalism.52 During the end of the Cold War, non-state 
actors using religion to justify political violence emerged.53 The 
Middle East and Central Asia became the center of 
fundamentalist, extremist groups seeking to overthrow 
                                                                                                     
 48. See Daniel Byman & Sara Bjergand Moller, The United States and the 
Middle East: Interests, Risks, and Costs, in SUSTAINABLE SECURITY: RETHINKING 
AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 291 (Jeremi Suri & Benjamin Valentino 
eds., 2016) (discussing that the spread of democracy was essential to the 
Administration’s counterterrorism strategy); see also MUSLIMS IN THE WEST AFTER 
9/11: RELIGIONS, POLITICS AND LAW 93–97 (Jocelyne Cesari ed., 2010). 
 49. See generally EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY 
STRATEGY 6 (2006); EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 
5, 37–38 (2010); EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 
19, 21 (2015). 
 50. See generally EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY 
STRATEGY 4 (2006); EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 
5 (2010); EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 21 (2015). 
 51. See, e.g., Dalacoura, supra note 27, at 102 (“[T]he assumption on which 
the Bush counter-terrorism policy was based . . . was that authoritarianism in the 
Middle East was at least one important cause of Islamist terrorism.”).  
 52. See Victor Asal & R. Karl Rethemeyer, The Nature of the Beast: 
Organizational Structures and the Lethality of Terrorist Attacks, 70 J. POLITICS 
437, 439 (2008) (“[T]he most lethal terrorist organizations are those motivated by 
both religion and ethnonationalism.”). 
 53. See, e.g., Walter Enders & Todd Sandler, After 9/11: Is it All Different 
Now?, 49 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 259, 263 (2005) (noting the rising influence of 
fundamentalist terrorism even though state sponsored terrorism was decreasing). 
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authoritarian regimes beholden to American interests.54 These 
terrorists began by targeting Middle East regimes deemed the 
“Near Enemy” and eventually spread to their Western 
backers— the “Far Enemy.”55  
Al Qaeda and its progeny, ISIS, reject the Westphalian 
nation-state European model and seek to replace it with an Islamic 
caliphate order.56 Attributing the Middle East’s delayed 
development and moral corrosion to Western political and 
economic models and American imperialism, these transnational 
terrorists call for a pan-Islamic caliphate ruling all states with 
Muslim-majority populations.57 To them, the Middle East’s 
problems are a direct result of European colonialism that 
continues to the present day through lackey dictators.58 Muslims, 
therefore, have a religious duty to revolt against Western 
hegemony through an Islamic awakening that will return Islamic 
civilization as a dominant actor in world politics.59 For these 
reasons, some scholars argue that political reforms, economic 
development, or democracy promotion in Muslim majority 
countries will not affect the behavior of transnational terrorists.60 
                                                                                                     
 54. See BURGAT, supra note 23, at 32–33 (noting the geographical 
concentration of fundamentalist views). 
 55. See INST. FOR ECON. & PEACE, supra note 43, at 2 (noting that ISIS has 
advocated for attacks against the United States, Canada, Australia, and 
European countries). But see Gary LaFree et al., Trajectories of Terrorism: Attack 
Patterns of Foreign Groups that have Targeted the United States, 1970–2004, 8 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 445, 470 (2009) (“[M]ost terrorist attacks by foreign 
groups deemed dangerous to national security by the U.S. government are in fact 
directed at non-U.S. targets.”). 
 56. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 23, at 46–47 (noting that 
counterterrorism aims to preserve the legitimacy of the existing order and 
maintaining political authority). 
 57. See id. at 17 (noting that modern pan-Islamism has roots in the 
anti-colonial movement by Muslim intellectuals). 
 58. See BURGAT, supra note 23, at 40–41 (describing the lingering effects of 
colonialism). 
 59. See, e.g., STERN & BERGER, supra note 25, at 117 (detailing ISIS 
propaganda disclaiming democracy, secularism, nationalism, and other Western 
ideals); DALACOURA, supra note 28, at 15, 21 (critiquing terrorism studies for 
engaging in Islamic “exceptionalism”).  
 60. See generally F. Gregory Gause III, Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?, 
FOREIGN AFF. (Sept. 2005), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-
east/2005-09-01/can-democracy-stop-terrorism (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (on file 
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This reasoning, however, incorrectly assumes the rise of Islamic 
political movements in the Middle East take both violent and 
nonviolent forms—and overlooks that most political Islamists are 
nonviolent.61  
A nation’s position on the causes of terrorism shapes its 
counterterrorism practices. Those who believe terrorism is 
ideologically driven are more likely to adopt militaristic, 
rights-infringing practices based on essentialized perceptions of 
the target group’s identity.62 In contrast, a more nuanced 
understanding of the social and economic causes of terrorism 
recognizes the importance of civil and human rights in preventing 
terrorism, thereby leaning towards a development-based 
approach.63 
While international legal instruments acknowledge the 
importance of human rights, civil liberties, and development, it is 
up to each individual nation to determine the extent to which its 
counterterrorism practices comport with domestic and 
international rights norms. 
III. The Legal and Policy Framework for Transnational 
Counterterrorism 
The old adage that one person’s terrorist is another person’s 
freedom fighter is no less true today than it has been throughout 
                                                                                                     
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Alan B. Krueger & Jitka Malečková, 
Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?, 17 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 119 (2003).   
 61. See DALACOURA, supra note 28, at 15, 21 (noting an assumption of an 
inherent association between terrorism and Islam); Krueger & Malečková, supra 
note 60, at 121 (noting that majority of Islamist groups in the Middle East are 
nonviolent and integrated in their respective political systems); see also Jacob 
Poushter, In Nations With Significant Muslim Populations, Much Disdain for 
ISIS, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2015/11/17/in-nations-with-significant-muslim-populations-much-disdain-
for-isis/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (finding that data collected in eleven 
Muslim-majority countries demonstrated overwhelmingly negative views of ISIS) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 62.  See generally Jeremy Pressman, Rethinking Transnational 
Counterterrorism: Beyond a National Framework, 30 WASH. Q. 63 (2007). 
 63. See generally id.  
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history.64 Motivated by political, social, and economic goals, 
transnational terrorists proclaim their violence is necessary to 
defend against state injustice and oppression.65 Followers accept 
skewed interpretations of religious and secular ideologies because 
they believe their cause is just.66 Because terrorism is what one 
scholar characterizes as a “gray-area phenomenon, something 
between crime and war, state violence and insurgent violence, 
conflict and violence, and propaganda and direct action,” the 
international community cannot agree on a universal definition.67 
Indeed, there is no universal definition of terrorism.68 Nonetheless, 
most competing definitions of terrorism include four essential 
components: (1) a violent act; (2) civilian victims; (3) the 
                                                                                                     
 64. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Control of International Terrorism: A 
Policy-Oriented Assessment, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 83, 101 (2002) (“[T]he 
phenomenon is as old as history, even as its manifestations have changed as a 
result of new technology.”); Kennedy Graham, The Security Council and 
Counterterrorism: Global and Regional Approaches to an Elusive Public Good, 17 
TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 37, 40 (2005) (highlighting modern usage of the 
phrase). 
 65. See Graham, supra note 64, at 40–45 (providing a succinct typology of 
different groups that use violence for political purposes). 
 66. See STERN & BERGER, supra note 25, at 224 (noting that violent 
apocalyptic groups such as Al Qaeda and ISIS see themselves as fighting a cosmic 
war between good and evil). 
 67. CRELINSTEN, supra note 26, at 39. The political science literature offers 
the following generic definition of terrorism: “the premeditated use or threat to 
use violence by individuals or subnational groups against noncombatants in order 
to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience 
beyond that of the immediate victim.” SANDLER ET AL., supra note 4, at 5; see also 
Enders & Sandler, supra note 53, at 260 (“Terrorism is the premeditated use or 
threat of use of violence by individuals or subnational groups to obtain a political 
or social objective through intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the 
immediate victims.”). 
 68. See, e.g., Krueger & Malečková, supra note 60, at 121 (stating there are 
over 100 scholarly or diplomatic definitions of terrorism). U.S. law defines 
international terrorism as an intentional violent act or acts dangerous to human 
life that violate U.S. criminal laws and appear to be intended to intimidate or 
coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy of a government by 
intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government by mass 
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and occurs primarily outside of the 
United States. See USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 
363 (2001). The European Union goes further to define terrorism as a set of 
criminal tactics that destabilize or destroy fundamental principles of democratic 
societies. See EUROPOL, TE-SAT 2010: EU TERRORISM SITUATION AND TREND 
REPORT 5 (2010). 
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perpetrators have a political, religious, or social motive; and 
(4) terrorists seek to provoke a political reaction and spread fear.69 
Notably, terrorism is not war, guerilla warfare, or insurgency even 
though terrorist acts may be deployed in those contexts.70 
Historically, terrorism was domestic insofar as its effect on the 
citizens, institutions, property, and policies of a defined geography. 
The perpetrators and the victims were from the same host country, 
and the terrorist act occurred within the host country’s 
jurisdiction.71 Transnational terrorism, in contrast, occurs when 
individuals or entities from two or more states directly participate 
in a terrorist act.72 Attacks by perpetrators in one country against 
targets in another country, as well as against multilateral 
organizations,73 emerged during the late 1960s when left wing 
anti-capitalist terrorist groups and Palestinian liberation groups 
attacked foreign corporations, multilateral organizations, and 
foreign military targets.74 In the years following the September 
11th attacks against the World Trade Center in New York City, 
U.S. property and citizens were targeted more frequently than 
other nations in large part because the U.S. military had a large 
contingency in Iraq and surrounding countries.75 
As transnational terrorism grew, so too did the need for 
cooperation between states to counter it. In contrast to nationalist 
groups, Al Qaeda and ISIS target Middle Eastern governments in 
                                                                                                     
 69. See STERN & BERGER, supra note 25, at 142–43 (describing terrorist 
groups’ tactics and motivations); CRELINSTEN, supra note 26, at 78 (describing 
common characteristics of terrorism). 
 70. See generally BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM (2006); SANDLER ET AL., 
supra note 4; STERN & BERGER, supra note 25. 
 71. See SANDLER ET AL., supra note 4, at 7–8 (describing the internal impacts 
of terrorism). 
 72. See Shaikh, supra note 4, at 2133 (including incidents originating in one 
country and ending in another). 
 73. See SANDLER ET AL., supra note 4, at 8 (discussing the various models of 
transnational terrorist attacks). 
 74. See id. at 12; DALACOURA, supra note 28. 
 75. See SANDLER ET AL., supra note 4, at 8 (citing data showing that in 2006, 
40% of transnational terrorism was directed at U.S. interests); David P. Oakley 
& Patrick Proctor, Ten Years of GWOT, the Failure of Democratization and the 
Fallacy of “Ungoverned Spaces”, 5 J. STRATEGIC SECURITY 8, 8 (2012) (noting the 
United States spent eight years and approximately $806 billion in Iraq since 
2003). 
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their quest to replace the Westphalian nation-state model with a 
pre-modern pan-Islamic caliphate.76 The rise in transnational 
terrorism has made states’ counterterrorism policies 
interdependent, and generated multiple international 
counterterrorism instruments.77 Even before the September 11th 
attacks triggered a flurry of interstate coordination, the United 
Nations was coordinating counterterrorism among states.78 
A. Prioritizing Terrorism Prevention 
In 1994, the UN General Assembly issued the Declaration on 
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism.79 The UN urged 
states “to take all appropriate measures at the national and 
international levels to eliminate terrorism”80 and emphasized “the 
need further to strengthen international cooperation between 
States.”81 The Security Council invoked its authority under Article 
39 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter to demand that states actively 
root out terrorists within their territories.82 Security Council 
Resolution 1373 (drafted primarily by the United States) was 
issued on September 28, 2001 and declared that terrorism is a per 
se threat to international peace and security.83 Similarly, Security 
                                                                                                     
 76. See, e.g., DALACOURA, supra note 28, at 12 (explaining that terrorist 
groups oppose Western forms of government). But see JACKSON ET AL., supra note 
23, at 22–23 (noting that Western military interventions or civil war situations 
allow Islamist extremist groups to fight alongside resistance groups and to impose 
their politico-religious narrative on the national struggle). 
 77. See G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 71 (Oct. 24, 2005) (“We acknowledge that we are 
living in an interdependent and global world and that many of today’s threats 
recognize no national boundaries, are interlinked and must be tackled at the 
global, regional and national levels in accordance with the Charter and 
international law.”). 
 78. See Graham, supra note 64, at 45–49 (discussing modern 
counterterrorism coordination before 2001). 
 79. See G.A. Res. 49/60, ¶ 1 (Dec. 9, 1994) (calling for international 
cooperation and development of international law). 
 80. Id. ¶ 4.  
 81. G.A. Res. 51/210, annex (Dec. 17, 1996). 
 82. See U.N. Charter art. 43 (authorizing investigation into any dispute or 
situation which might threaten international security).  
 83. See S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 1 (Sept. 28, 2001) (calling for states to complement 
all international counterterrorism efforts). 
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Council Resolutions 1377 (2001), 1540 (2004), 1566 (2004), and 
1624 (2006) situated international terrorism as the most serious 
threat to international peace and called on states to participate in 
a “sustained, comprehensive approach involving the active 
participation and collaboration of Member States of the United 
Nations . . . to combat the scourge of international terrorism.”84  
The Security Council called on all states to impose 
anti-terrorism criminal sanctions in domestic laws and prosecute 
any person who finances, plans, prepares, or perpetrates terrorists 
acts or supports such acts.85 States were obliged to prevent 
individuals and groups from using their territory for transnational 
terrorism, prohibit terrorists from moving through their territory, 
strengthen security of international borders, combat fraudulent 
travel documents, and share relevant counterterrorism 
information with other states.86  
To monitor states’ compliance with counterterrorism 
obligations and facilitate technical assistance with limited 
implementation capacities, Resolution 1373 established the 
Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC)—which notably left out the 
importance of compliance with human rights law.87 Instead, the 
                                                                                                     
 84. S.C. Res. 1377, ¶ 2 (Nov. 12, 2001).   
 85. See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 83, ¶ 1 (criminalizing direct or indirect 
funding); Kim Lane Scheppele, The International Standardization of National 
Security Law, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 437, 449 (2010) (arguing the UN’s 
demands for states to change their domestic laws were unprecedented). 
 86. See Heupel, supra note 5, at 489 (noting that the strategy addresses the 
distinct features of transnational terrorism); see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 2001 viii (2002) (noting the coordination of 
intelligence sharing between the United States and its Middle East allies in global 
war on terror). 
 87. See DUFFY, supra note 13, at 546 (linking the resolution to human rights 
violations). Like other international obligations, counterterrorism 
implementation is not consistent across countries. To address compliance 
problems, policy makers adopt one of two methodologies. The Enforcement School 
deters non-compliance by “controlling the cost-benefit calculation of states 
through monitoring and the threat or use of sanctions in the cases of norms 
violation.” Heupel, supra note 5, at 483. The Management School assumes that 
states intend to comply with international rules but fail to do so due to insufficient 
economic or political capacity. As such, proponents of this school recommend 
problem-solving and capacity building strategies rather than enforcement 
strategies. Id.; see also Scheppele, supra note 85, at 443 (“[W]idespread 
compliance with the Resolution 1373 framework makes the anti-terrorism 
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CTC focuses on UN member states’ compliance with 
counterterrorism practices through periodic reports.88 
By 2005, there were at least thirteen international 
instruments related to the prevention and suppression of terrorism 
and the Security Council had issued five resolutions.89 In 2006, the 
United Nations issued its first Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy 
based on four pillars: (1) addressing the conditions conducive to the 
spread of terrorism; (2) preventing and combatting terrorism; 
(3) building states’ capacity and strengthening the role of the 
United Nations; and (4) ensuring human rights and the rule of 
law.90 In the years following 9/11, the second pillar of the UN’s 
counterterrorism strategy—preventing and combatting 
terrorism—dominated international efforts, at the expense of 
human rights, rule of law, and civil liberties.91 
B. Unfulfilled Commitments to Human Rights 
Shortly after the September 11th terrorist attacks, the 
General Assembly emphasized the importance of “promot[ing] and 
protect[ing] human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as 
due process and the rule of law, while countering terrorism” in its 
multiple resolutions calling for the protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism.92 The Security 
Council also recognized that counterterrorism measures should 
comply with international human rights, refugee, and 
                                                                                                     
campaign an extraordinary example in international law.”). 
 88. See PLESSIS, supra note 3, at 45 (noting that the CTC identifies priority 
areas by reviewing states’ reports). 
 89. See, e.g., Heupel, supra note 5, at 488–90 (describing resolutions 
prohibiting the movement of terrorists, implementing sanctions, and suppressing 
weapons proliferation). 
 90. See G.A. Res. 60/288, at 1–2 (Sept. 20, 2006) (reaffirming the need for 
cooperation among states). 
 91. See DUFFY, supra note 13, at 554 (highlighting the emphasis on security 
over individual rights). 
 92. See generally G.A. Res. 57/219 (Feb. 27, 2003); G.A. Res. 58/187 (Mar. 22, 
2004); G.A. Res. 59/191 (Mar. 10, 2005); G.A. Third Comm., Recognizing the Role 
of Human Rights Defenders and the Need for Their Protection, U.N. Doc. 
A/C.3/70/L.46/Rev. 1 (Nov. 13, 2015). 
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humanitarian law.93 The 2005 General Assembly World Summit 
Outcome Resolution declared “[s]tates must ensure that any 
measures taken to combat terrorism comply with their obligations 
under international law, in particular human rights law, refugee 
law and international humanitarian law.”94 As egregious human 
rights violations came to light, the UN Commission on Human 
Rights appointed a special rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while 
countering terrorism.95 That same year, the United Nations 
developed a Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. 
The UN emphasized human rights as an integral part of 
effective counterterrorism, and reiterated its commitment to 
sponsor programs that “promote dialogue, tolerance and 
understanding among civilizations, cultures, peoples and religions, 
and to promote mutual respect for and prevent the defamation of 
religions, religious values, beliefs, and cultures.”96 In rejecting the 
clash of civilizations narrative, the Secretary General launched the 
Alliance of Civilizations.97 This initiative brought together 
governments and civil society to “improve understanding and 
cooperative relations among nations and peoples across cultures 
and religions—in particular, between the so called Western and 
Muslim societies—and in the process, to help counter the forces 
that fuel polarization and extremism.”98 
                                                                                                     
 93. See G.A. Res. 60/288, annex (Sept. 20, 2006) (emphasizing the legal 
obligations for prosecuting terrorist suspects). Notably, some Security Council 
resolutions did not include provisions recognizing the importance of protecting 
human rights. See S.C. Res. 1377 (Nov. 12, 2001); S.C. Res. 1455 (Jan. 17, 2003). 
But see S.C. Res. 1456, ¶ 6 (Jan. 20, 2003) (“States must ensure that any measure 
taken to combat terrorism comply with all their obligations under international 
law, and should adopt such measures in accordance with international law, in 
particular international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law.”). 
 94. G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 85 (Oct. 24, 2005). 
 95. See Human Rights Council Res. 2005/80, ¶ 14 (Apr. 21, 2005) (appointing 
a special rapporteur to identify best practices to counter terrorism). 
 96. G.A. Res. 60/288, supra note 90, at 4. 
 97. See id. (promoting dialogue, tolerance and understanding); History, 
UNITED NATIONS ALLIANCE OF CIVILIZATIONS, https://www.unaoc.org/who-we-
are/history/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2018) (noting the Alliance’s formation against 
the backdrop of the global war on terror) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 98. History, supra note 97. 
1592 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1573 (2018) 
In direct contradiction to these commitments, the U.S. 
military and intelligence agencies bombed suspected terrorist 
training camps, kidnapped suspected terrorists into secret 
rendition programs, tortured terrorism suspects, and placed 
suspects in indefinite detention in Guantanamo and other military 
bases in Central Asia and the Middle East.99 Law enforcement 
agencies created travel screening watchlists and No Fly Lists, 
spied on Muslim and Arab communities based on racial and ethnic 
profiling, designated Muslim civil society groups as terrorists, 
prosecuted Muslims for material support to terrorism, froze assets 
of Islamic charities, and deported Muslims suspected of holding 
anti-Western political views or religious associations.100  
Counterterrorism practices treated Muslim, Arab, and South 
Asian individuals and communities as potential terrorists.101 
Security discourse grounded in fear and stereotypes equating 
terrorism with Islam, thereby propagating the narrative that 
Islam and the West are engaged in a clash of civilizations.102 Islam 
and Muslims replaced Communism and Russians, respectively, as 
the civilizational threat to Western democracy.103 Transnational 
                                                                                                     
 99. See Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 3 
(describing aggressive methods of torture).  
 100. See DUFFY, supra note 13, at 550 (arguing that counterterrorism efforts 
lead to marginalization of individual rights); JACKSON ET AL., supra note 23, at 66 
(discussing how the “evil international terrorist” became associated with 
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financing acts). 
 101. See HERMAN, supra note 3, at 197 (describing targeted surveillance 
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 102. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 23, at 23 (detailing the impact of divisive 
rhetoric); President George W. Bush, Address to Congress (Sept. 20, 2001) (“This 
is the world’s fight. This is civilization’s fight. This is the fight of all who believe 
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 103. See LISA STAMPNITZKY, DISCIPLINING TERROR: HOW EXPERTS INVENTED 
“TERRORISM” 49–83 (2013) (arguing that political discourse crafted Islam as a 
threat to Western ideals); Sahar F. Aziz, Caught in a Preventive Dragnet: Selective 
Counterterrorism in a Post-9/11 America, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 429, 475 (2012) 
(noting that the United States disproportionately focuses on terrorist acts 
committed by Muslims); Dalia F. Fahmy, The Green Scare is Not McCarthyism 
2.0: How Islamophobia is Redefining the Use of Propaganda in Foreign and 
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terrorists leveraged this apocalyptic narrative to recruit 
disaffected, impoverished, and oppressed young men in Muslim 
majority and Western countries to join their proclaimed just 
cause.104 And human rights groups added the United States to 
their list of nations who violated human rights.105 
IV. The Authoritarianization Effect of Transnational 
Counterterrorism 
The commitment to cooperate with Middle Eastern nations to 
stop transnational terrorism has been a consistent message from 
the White House since 2001.106 President Bush pledged “to 
strengthen our partnership with every nation that joins in the fight 
against terror. We deepened our security cooperation with allies 
like Jordan and Egypt, and with our friends in the Gulf.”107 
President Obama proclaimed in his 2011 National Strategy for 
Counterterrorism that the “United States alone cannot eliminate 
every terrorist or terrorist organization that threatens our safety, 
security, or interests . . . we must join with key partners and allies 
to share the burdens of common security.”108 While the Obama 
Administration admitted these partners do not share America’s 
values, it believed through cooperation the United States would 
“demonstrat[e] through our example the value of upholding human 
rights and responsible governance [and] these partners will 
ultimately be more stable and successful if they move toward these 
principles.”109  
                                                                                                     
Domestic Affairs, 39 DIALECTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 63, 67 (2015). 
 104. See STERN & BERGER, supra note 25, at 194–95 (discussing the 
deployment of identity-based extremism in the Middle East and use of narratives 
of battles between good and evil). 
 105. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IN THE NAME OF SECURITY: 
COUNTERTERRORISM LAWS WORLDWIDE SINCE SEPTEMBER 11 10–16 (2012) 
(describing the UN’s unprecedented counterterrorism resolutions).  
 106. See Byman & Moller, supra note 48, at 288–99 (noting that Egypt, 
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen were especially valued for their cooperation). 
 107. President George W. Bush, Address at the Saban Forum (Dec. 5, 2008).  
 108. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR 
COUNTERTERRORISM 7 (2011). 
 109. Id. 
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What appears to have occurred, however, is the opposite. The 
United States violated human rights abroad and expanded 
executive power at the expense of civil liberties at home. All the 
while, Middle East partners have become more authoritarian in 
their practices using national security as pretext. Human rights 
are not advancing as a result of transnational counterterrorism 
coordination. Instead, authoritarian practices are spreading to 
Western nations.110  
To be sure, I am not arguing the United States has become an 
authoritarian state. Rather, I posit that formal and informal 
transnational counterterrorism coordination facilitates Middle 
East authoritarian practices influencing the United States in ways 
that erode civil liberties at home and human rights abroad.111 The 
shift from a criminal law enforcement paradigm to an open-ended 
war model, for example, places the United States in an unofficial 
state of emergency.112 With that comes deference to 
rights-infringing national security practices. Fewer rights and 
liberties become the new normal. 
Expansions in executive authority under the auspices of 
national security coupled with legislative changes have 
circumscribed the oversight role of the courts.113 Politicians’ 
rhetoric inflates fears of terrorists waiting to strike at any 
moment.114 The media exacerbates the public’s fears through 
extensive coverage of terrorism while leaving out data showing the 
likelihood of being killed by a terrorist attack is miniscule; not to 
mention the overwhelming majority of terrorist attacks are 
directed at non-U.S. targets.115 Nevertheless, Congress passes laws 
                                                                                                     
 110. See infra Part IV.C (detailing the normalization of torture and 
surveillance by the United States government). 
 111. See Hafner-Burton & Shapiro, supra note 16, at 415 (arguing that the 
United States must protect human rights to effectively fight the war on terror). 
 112. See Proclamation No. 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,199 (Sept. 14, 2001) 
(declaring a national state of emergency due to the immediate threat of future 
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 113. See Setty, supra note 2, at 671–72 (arguing that the judiciary has 
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 114. See generally President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address 
(Jan. 29, 2002). 
 115. See LaFree et al., supra note 55, at 468 (“[B]etween 1970 and 2004, more 
U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM 1595 
granting the president expansive authorities and judges defer to 
executive action.116 Over time, such trends have led to abuses of 
authority arising from the concentration of power in the executive 
branch.117 
By comparing the national security practices of a dominant 
Middle East country and longtime U.S. ally, Egypt, with those of 
the United States, I demonstrate how transnational 
counterterrorism may be contributing to the normalization of 
human rights and civil liberties violations in Western 
democracies.118 Although counterterrorism coordination is not the 
sole cause of U.S. rights violations, it is an overlooked factor that 
warrants further scrutiny by government officials and citizens 
seeking to reverse the misguided subordination of rights to 
security. My comparison focuses on five practices: (1) torture; 
(2) indefinite detention; (3) inhumane conditions of detention; 
(4) mass surveillance; and (5) selective enforcement of 
anti-terrorism laws against Muslims and dissidents. 
A common theme permeating these rights-infringing practices 
is the reduced levels of due process afforded targets as a result of 
judicial inaction, legislative mandate, or executive fiat in a 
secretive counterterrorism regime.119 Moreover, these practices 
occurred despite ratification of international human rights 
agreements that prohibit both Egypt and the United States from 
engaging in such practices.120 That the United States is 
                                                                                                     
than 96% of more than 16,000 terrorist attacks were in fact directed at non-U.S. 
targets.”). 
 116. See generally DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY 
AMERICA IS LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR (2009). 
 117. See Setty, supra note 2, at 644 (emphasizing the lack of accountability 
and oversight of the executive branch); Joanna Baltes et al., Convicted Terrorists: 
Sentencing Considerations and Their Policy Implications, 8 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. 
& POL’Y 347, 348 (2016) (noting the lack of transparency surrounding the 
executive’s discretion on whether or not to seek execution). 
 118. See JEREMY M. SHARP, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33003, EGYPT: 
BACKGROUND AND U.S. RELATIONS 11 (2017) (detailing Egypt’s use of mass trials 
and anti-protest laws). 
 119. See DUFFY, supra note 13, at 902 (describing the loss of individual rights). 
 120. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (obligating states to protect the right to life; right to be free from 
torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; right to a fair trial by an 
independent and impartial court; and right to humane conditions of detention). 
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systemically violating these commitments with impunity evinces a 
troubling transnational race to the bottom.121 
A. Coordination in Counterterrorism Between the United States 
and Middle East Countries 
While international coordination predated the September 
11th terrorist attacks, the frequency and scope of counterterrorism 
coordination afterward expanded dramatically.122 United States 
national security strategy documents emphasized working with 
foreign partners as essential to counterterrorism efforts.123 Law 
enforcement agencies share intelligence, conduct joint trainings 
and operations, and collaborate on countering radicalization.124 
Coordinated intelligence gathering is also an essential component 
of transnational counterterrorism.125 For instance, thousands of 
FBI agents work with their foreign counterparts to prevent 
terrorist attacks from Al Qaeda, ISIS, and other organizations.126 
Egyptian officials tout their intelligence sharing and participation 
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Campaign Against Islamists, and Human Rights Concerns, Heat Up, WASH. REP. 
ON MIDDLE E. AFF., Aug. 1993, at 54; CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32438, U.N. 
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE (CAT): OVERVIEW AND APPLICATION TO 
INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES (2010). 
 121. See generally CHALLENGING U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS SINCE 9/11 
(Ann Fagan Ginger ed., 2005). 
 122. See, e.g., PLESSIS, supra note 3, at 43 (describing 9/11 as the catalyst for 
new areas of cooperation to combat terrorism). 
 123. See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 108, at 9 (stating 
the necessity of partnering with states that face terrorist threats).  
 124. See id. at 7 (stating that partnering leads to increased stability); PLESSIS, 
supra note 3, at 37–38 (describing efforts to gather evidence across borders). But 
see WADIE E. SAID, CRIMES OF TERROR 14–16 (2015) (critiquing 
counter-radicalization as using religious orthodoxy as a proxy for terrorism). 
 125. See generally Letter from Donald J. Trump, President of the U.S., to 
Congressional Leaders (June 6, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Byman & Moller, supra note 48. 
 126. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COUNTERING THE THREAT OF TERRORISM, 
INCLUDING COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE 2 (2014) (noting that federal 
agent work in surveillance, infrastructure, and partnerships).  
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in coalition meetings aimed at coordinating counterterrorism 
strategy and operations.127 But the disparate legal regimes 
governing U.S. and Middle Eastern security officers result in U.S. 
officials having access to intelligence obtained through torture and 
other human rights violations.128  
Separate from questions about the veracity of the information, 
intelligence sharing incentivizes outsourcing intelligence 
collection to Middle East officials unrestrained by laws and norms 
that protect human rights and civil liberties. Moreover, joint 
intelligence gathering operations provide opportunities for 
American counterterrorism officers to participate in 
rights-infringing methods of intelligence gathering, as is the case 
in the extraordinary rendition program.129 
Military cooperation with Middle Eastern countries has also 
increased.130 Since 9/11, the United States military has expanded 
its basing and access rights; bolstered defense cooperation; and 
sold military equipment to Jordan, Egypt, the United Arab 
Emirates, and Saudi Arabia.131 U.S. military bases in Kuwait, 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, the UAE, Turkey, and 
Afghanistan facilitate counterterrorism coordination among 
military personnel.132 Additionally, a secret unmanned aerial 
                                                                                                     
 127. See Egypt-U.S. Relations, EMBASSY OF EGYPT, http://www.egypt 
embassy.net/egypt-us-relations/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (stating a mutual 
commitment to advancing regional stability) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 128. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 86, at viii (describing U.S. law 
enforcement’s ability to investigate potential terrorists). 
 129. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “WORK ON HIM UNTIL HE CONFESSES” 21–26 
(2011) (detailing regular torture by Egypt’s federal law enforcement). An 
additional concern is the abuse of shared intelligence by a foreign agency to 
persecute a citizen rather than prevent a crime or terrorist act. See Petra 
Bartosiewicz, Deploying Informants, the FBI Stings Muslims, NATION (June 14, 
2012), https://www.thenation.com/article/deploying-informants-fbi-stings-
muslims/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (reporting on the arrest and torture of Yonas 
Fikre, a Muslim American from Portland, Oregon, while he was in the United 
Arab Emirates on the instruction of the U.S. intelligence services) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 130. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DANGEROUS DEALINGS 2 (2002) (citing 
increased international presence). 
 131. See Byman & Moller, supra note 48, at 263–64 (documenting personnel 
and equipment expansion). 
 132. See id. at 265–66 (describing operations of U.S. military bases in the 
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vehicle base is reportedly operating out of Saudi Arabia that is 
used for drone attacks against targets in Yemen.133 
As transnational terrorism spread across the Middle East, 
U.S. military arms sales soared. In 2011, the United States 
finalized a $29 billion arms deal with Saudi Arabia and a $10 
billion deal with the UAE.134 In 2017, the Trump Administration 
signed a $110 billion multi-year arms sale to Saudi Arabia, the 
largest in history between the two countries, and sold $12 billion 
of U.S. arms to Qatar.135 Cooperation also comes in the form of 
training programs aimed at enhancing transnational 
counterterrorism. Through the Antiterrorism Assistance Program, 
for example, the United States trains law enforcement and 
security services of foreign allies.136 Similarly, “the U.S. Central 
Command (USCENTCOM), which covers the Middle East, North 
Africa, and Asia, conducted forty-five multilateral and bilateral 
training exercises” with Middle Eastern, North African, and Asian 
countries137 and hosts a biennial multinational training exercise 
hosted by Egypt and the United States.138  
The Combatting Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) trains 
foreign mid-level and senior level security and military officials. 
The Department of Defense (DOD) manages the CTFP to build 
                                                                                                     
Middle East).  
 133. See Micah Zenko & Emma Welch, Where the Drones Are, FOREIGN POL’Y 
(May 29, 2012, 11:36 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/05/29/where-the-drones-
are/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (reporting that the United States uses the base 
for surveillance and combat missions) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 134. See Byman & Moller, supra note 48, at 267 (outlining the weapons deal). 
 135. See US State Department Approves Saudi Arabia Arms Sale, BBC NEWS 
(Nov. 16, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-34838937 (last visited 
Sept. 10, 2018) (stating the Saudi Arabia is one of the biggest buyers of U.S. 
weapons) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 136. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 86, at xiii (noting training areas 
including airport security and hostage rescue). 
 137. DAKOTA L. WOOD, 2018 INDEX OF U.S. MILITARY STRENGTH 145 (2018). 
 138. See U.S., Egypt Kick Off Exercise Bright Star 2017, U.S. CENT. COMMAND, 
http://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/News-Article-
View/Article/1308877/us-egypt-kick-off-exercise-bright-star-2017/ (last visited 
Sept. 10, 2018) (detailing the combined field training exercise between Egypt and 
the United States) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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partnerships with foreign allies.139 According to the DOD, “[t]he 
CTFP provides unique relationship and capacity-building 
opportunities that enable partner nations to address threats of 
terrorism within their borders and regions and strengthens 
collaboration with and support for U.S. and partner efforts to 
defeat terrorism.”140 Over 250 foreign officials have participated in 
the program.141 In 2015, a CTFP alumni event was held in Amman, 
Jordan where more than forty alumni from twenty countries 
discussed strategies on how to respond to ISIS, Boko Haram, 
Al-Shabaab, and Al Qaeda.142  
Additionally, American police and intelligence officers are sent 
to foreign countries through bilateral arrangements where they 
build relationships and a network for international cooperation.143 
Through these interactions, information, skills, and norms are 
exchanged at the institutional and individual level.144  
Contrary to commonly held assumptions that Western liberal 
democratic norms are transferred to foreign allies, the exchange is 
two-way. Western officials learn from their Middle East 
counterparts that the only way to eradicate terrorism is with an 
iron-fisted, militarized approach.145 As a result, rights infringing 
practices and norms have infected how the United States counters 
terrorism both at home and abroad.146 
                                                                                                     
 139. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, REGIONAL DEFENSE COMBATING TERRORISM 
FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM 1 (2015) (outlining the program’s objectives).  
 140. Id. at 3. 
 141. See id. at 1 (reporting a budget of $4,767,190 for the 256 participants). 
 142. See id. at 11 (describing alumni panels on combatting radical 
extremism). 
 143. See International Operations, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/about/leadership-
and-structure/international-operations (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (providing an 
overview of the FBI’s international program) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review).  
 144. See id. (describing the exchange of training information).  
 145. See Steven Erlanger, Israeli Leader Promises to Use ‘Iron Fist’ to Stop 
Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/02/ 
international/middleeast/israeli-leader-promises-to-use-iron-fist-to-stop.html 
(last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (discussing Israel’s acting prime minister, Ehud 
Olmert’s, advice to remove all restrictions on the counterterrorism security 
establishment) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 146. See Scheppele, supra note 85, at 451 (“The problem with the 
rights-violating aspects of the Security Council framework, then, is not with the 
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B. Rights-Infringing Counterterrorism in the Middle East: The 
Case of Egypt 
Middle Eastern regimes have long invoked national security 
as a ruse to eliminate political opposition, silence dissenters, and 
to quash civil society.147 The mantra of counterterrorism grants the 
state unfettered discretion to kill, torture, indefinitely detain, 
surveil, and prosecute those deemed a threat to the regime.148 
These practices pre-dated 9/11, and in fact have been the basis of 
international calls for democratization of the region.149  
Egypt—a longtime ally and counterterrorism partner of the 
United States—illustrates how a Middle Eastern state uses 
counterterrorism to violate human rights and civil liberties. Some 
of these authoritarian practices have shaped U.S. 
counterterrorism practices, albeit not to the same degree. 
Egregious forms of physical abuse have been a mainstay of 
Egyptian counterterrorism strategies for decades.150 By making 
the cost of dissent prohibitively costly, torture is a strategy that 
deters citizens from challenging the state’s authority.151 Causing 
the population to cower in fear, the regime proclaims harsh 
counterterrorism practices are necessary to preserve the security 
of the state.152 The regime’s autocratic grip on political power, not 
the people’s security, is the real objective.153 
                                                                                                     
intentions of the Security Council, but with the terrible quality of governance in 
many states in the world . . . .”). 
 147. See Jason Brownlee, A New Generation of Autocracy in Egypt, 14 BROWN 
J. WORLD AFF. 73, 77 (2008) (“This political elite still employs national security 
rhetoric to justify draconian assaults on civilian activists.”). 
 148. See id. at 78 (describing violent assaults on protestors).  
 149. See id. at 83 (noting that parties calling for democratization included the 
United States). 
 150. See Egypt: 7,400 Civilians Tried in Military Courts, HUM. RTS. WATCH 
(Apr. 13, 2016, 12:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/13/egypt-7400-
civilians-tried-military-courts (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (stating that most were 
sentenced after mass trials with no due process rights) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 151. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: TORTURE AND 
DETENTION IN EGYPT 72 (1992) (reporting torture as deterrence and punishment).  
 152. See id. (discussing the regimen’s motivation for torture).  
 153. See id. (“[T]he policy of the political security apparatus is to keep things 
under control.”). 
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The Mubarak regime engaged in widespread and systematic 
torture.154 A new counterterrorism law passed in 1992 granted 
police and security forces extensive powers to arrest, detain, and 
torture hundreds of people accused of belonging to political 
Islamist organizations.155 Terrorist detainees first disappeared 
into secret prisons outside the purview of law in order to be 
subjected to torture to extract information and coerce false 
confessions.156 Police also tortured detainees to pressure them to 
be informants on their friends, family, and co-workers upon 
release.157 Employing thousands of informants expanded the reach 
of intelligence services’ extensive monitoring and mass 
surveillance of the population—a feature of the post-9/11 national 
security regime in the United States.158  
Although dissidents of various political stripes have been 
victims of torture by the state, political Islamists have borne the 
brunt of the abuse.159 Detainees are forcibly disappeared and 
tortured by the state in locations unknown to their families or 
lawyers.160 Human rights reports document cases of torture by 
Egyptian security forces as far back as the 1980s. For instance, 
Amnesty International’s report “Ten Years of Torture” documents 
myriad forms of torture of Egyptian prisoners including being:  
                                                                                                     
 154. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2011: EGYPT, 2–3 (2011) 
(depicting regular torture by police and security forces).  
 155. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, EGYPT: HUMAN RIGHTS BACKGROUND, 2001 1 
(2001) (stating that hundreds of civilians were sent to military court).  
 156. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 129, at 4 (stating that security 
court trials relied on coerced confessions). 
 157. See AMNESTY INT’L, EGYPT: TEN YEARS OF TORTURE 2 (1991) (reporting 
that citizens were forced to collect information on friends or colleagues).   
 158. See David Smith, Presumed Suspect: Post-9/11 Intelligence Gathering, 
Race, and the First Amendment, 11 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR EASTERN L. 85, 
94– 95 (2011–2012) (outlining the FBI’s post-9/11 counterterrorism strategy). 
 159. See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 157, at 1 (describing wide-scale political 
arrests); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, POLICE, MILITARY TORTURE AND ABUSES 530 
(2013) (reporting at least eleven custodial deaths caused by police torture and 
several cases of torture by the military). 
 160. See Egypt: Counterterrorism Law Erodes Basic Rights, HUM. RTS. WATCH 
(Aug. 19, 2015, 1:45 AM), www.hrw.org/news/2015/08/19/egypt-counterterrorism-
law-erodes-basic-rights (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (noting that citizens were 
forcibly disappeared without access to lawyers) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
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[B]lindfolded, stripped of their clothes and suspended from their 
wrists, bound or handcuffed together, sometimes in contorted 
positions, from the tops of doors or from barred windows. 
Victims have described how they have been forced to lie on their 
backs, their hands and feet bound together, a chair forced up 
under their armpits, another keeping their knees apart to 
restrict the body’s involuntary spasms as electric shocks were 
applied repeatedly to their nipples and genitals. Between 
torture sessions they were forced to stand in unnatural 
positions, often with arms and legs outstretched, for hours on 
end and beaten if they moved. Some were sexually abused.161  
These same torture tactics were unleashed on post-9/11 
terrorism suspects held in Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, and multiple 
extraordinary rendition sites. 
Detainees in Egyptian jails also frequently died from torture 
in what amounted to extrajudicial killings.162 The lucky ones 
survived only after they confessed to the state’s accusations.163 
Similar to the U.S. military round ups in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan after 9/11, most victims were innocent civilians rounded 
up arbitrarily after a terrorist attack.164 Confessions extracted 
under torture were then used as evidence in political trials without 
question to their veracity.165 
Because of legal and political impunity for security forces, very 
few torture victims obtain a remedy for their abuse, including in 
the United States.166 Calls for prosecution of high-level U.S. 
                                                                                                     
 161. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 157, at 1. 
 162. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 129, at 60–71 (detailing various 
torture-related deaths).  
 163. See Egypt: 7,400 Civilians Tried in Military Court, supra note 150 
(documenting cases of systemic torture by the Egyptian security service). 
 164. See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 157, at 2 (noting that many are held 
without charge or trial); Only Three of 116 Guantanamo Detainees Were Captured 
by US Forces, GUARDIAN, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/aug/25/ 
guantanamo-detainees-captured-pakistan-afghanistan (last updated Aug. 27, 
2015) (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (describing the U.S. Guantanamo detainees) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 165. See SAID, supra note 124, at 84–85 (discussing the case of Ahmed Omar 
Abu Ali wherein a confession extracted by Saudi officials allegedly during torture 
was used to prosecute Abu Ali in U.S. court). 
 166. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 129, at 84 (noting the 
government’s failure to investigate and prosecute perpetrators of torture); TRUDY 
BOND ET AL., SHADOW REPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE AGAINST 
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intelligence officials for torture of terrorism suspects have fallen 
on deaf ears.167 This system of impunity signals to officials that 
although torture may be illegal under international and domestic 
law, abusing detainees can continue without fear of prosecution.168  
In addition to being tortured, detainees are subjected to 
inhumane prison conditions in violation of human rights law.169 
According to a 1993 Human Rights Watch report, detainees were 
crammed in cells without toilets or running water.170 They were 
forced to sleep on filthy floors without mattresses or blankets.171 
Breaks were insufficiently afforded to detainees, and those granted 
ranged from merely five minutes to thirty minutes.172 Beatings and 
solitary confinement for weeks were common disciplinary tools 
imposed by abusive guards beyond external oversight or 
accountability.173 Similar allegations surfaced in Guantanamo, 
Bagram, and Abu Ghraib prisons managed by U.S. officials and 
their contractors.174 More than ten years later, another Human 
Rights Watch report found torture in Egypt remained pervasive.175 
Interviews in 2015 with nineteen torture victims found that 
                                                                                                     
TORTURE ON THE REVIEW OF THE PERIODIC REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 16 (2014) (stating that U.S. courts refused jurisdiction). 
 167. See BOND ET AL., supra note 166, at 6–10 (arguing that the U.S. has 
neither investigated nor prosecuted torture claims). 
 168. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GETTING AWAY WITH TORTURE? COMMAND 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE U.S. ABUSE OF DETAINEES 30 (2005) (detailing that the 
U.S. selectively complies with international law). 
 169. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PRISON CONDITIONS IN EGYPT: A FILTHY 
SYSTEM 29 (1993) (stating the government’s noncompliance with prisoner rights 
law). 
 170. See id. at 48 (describing that facilities were inadequate or inoperative).  
 171. See id. at 54 (detailing prisoners’ sleeping accommodations).  
 172. See id. at 78 (noting that daily breaks were short and infrequent).  
 173. See id. at 66 (documenting periods of solitary confinement up to four 
months). 
 174. See Matt Apuzzo et al., How U.S. Torture Left a Legacy of Damaged 
Minds, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/09/world/cia-torture-
guantanamo-bay.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (reporting prisoner conditions 
in Guantanamo Bay) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 175. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “WE DO UNREASONABLE THINGS 
HERE”: TORTURE AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN AL-SISI’S EGYPT (2017). 
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Egyptian security officers electrocuted, beat, and hung detainees 
by their limbs to force suspects to read prewritten confessions.176 
When faced with allegations of violating human rights laws, 
the Egyptian regime points to national security laws granting the 
executive broad leeway to take all appropriate measures to 
maintain the general order and security of the nation.177 
Emergency law, intermittently in effect since 1967 and 
continuously in effect since Sadat’s assassination in 1981, provided 
security forces legal cover for human rights violations.178 
Emergency law grants the president broad authority to detain 
persons deemed a threat to security and public order, leaving it to 
prosecutors and security forces to define “threat,” “security,” and 
“public order” when conducting investigations.179 With the legal 
authority to hold detainees for up to forty-five days renewable 
indefinitely, the Interior Ministry has free reign to indefinitely 
detain and torture these disappeared detainees.180 For those 
charged with a crime, the prosecution delays the trial for years, 
denying them due process rights.181 
                                                                                                     
 176. See id. at 1–6 (noting that these individuals could not contact relatives 
or an attorney). 
 177. See generally Mohamed A. Arafa, Egypt Between Fear & Reform in its 
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and Over Again, 7 ARIZ. SUMMIT L. REV. 1 (2013). 
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(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 179. See MOUSTAFA, supra note 178, at 154 (noting arbitrary execution of the 
laws). 
 180. See AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 157, at 2 (stating that the government 
could hold detainees without charge or trial); MOUSTAFA, supra note 178, at 154 
(discussing reports by the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights documenting 
over 7,800 cases of recurrent detention). 
 181. See Damian Cullen, Trial of Ibrahim Halawa in Egypt Delayed for 13th 
Time, IRISH TIMES (Mar. 6, 2016, 1:05 PM), http://www.irishtimes.com/ 
news/ireland/irish-news/trial-of-ibrahim-halawa-in-egypt-delayed-for-13th-time-
1.2562118 (last updated Mar. 6, 2016) (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (reporting that 
one detainee was imprisoned for 942 days) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review); Marwa Al-Asar, Egyptian Rights Group Accuses Justice System of 
Double Standards, MIDDLE EAST EYE, http://www.middleeasteye.net/ 
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Although the Egyptian government claims stringent 
anti-terrorism laws are necessary to deter and prosecute terrorists, 
the laws are frequently applied to civil society organizations and 
leaders who report on the state’s human rights violations. In the 
1990s, the president of the Egyptian Organization for Human 
Rights (EOHR), Hafez Abu Saada, was arrested and interrogated 
in retaliation for EOHR’s report documenting torture, deaths in 
custody, disappearances and horrible prison conditions.182 The 
case of Professor Sa’ad Eddin Ibrahim in 2001 further proved how 
far the government would go to quash nonviolent challenges to 
corruption, election irregularities, and abuse of power.183 Ibrahim, 
who held dual Egyptian and American citizenship, investigated 
election fraud and requested that the United States link foreign 
aid to Egypt’s human rights performance.184 In retaliation, the 
Egyptian government prosecuted Ibrahim in the Supreme State 
Security Court where he was charged with conspiring to bribe 
public officials, disseminating false information harmful to Egypt’s 
interest, and embezzling foreign funds.185  
Prosecutions of civil society leaders soared after the 2011 mass 
uprisings as the regime sought to regain its authoritarian grip on 
power.186 Journalists, lawyers, and human rights advocates were 
arrested and charged with threatening national security in 
                                                                                                     
news/egyptian-rights-group-accuses-justice-system-double-standards-525727160 
(last updated June 3, 2015) (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (reporting that multiple 
defendants were held for over two years after an amendment to the code of 
criminal procedure changed the two year limit for pretrial detention to periods of 
forty-five renewable days) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 182. See BENJAMIN STACHURSKY, THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF 
TRANSNATIONALIZATION 97 (2013) (describing that the government used military 
decrees to criminalize human rights activists). 
 183. See STEVEN A. COOK, RULING BUT NOT GOVERNING: THE MILITARY AND 
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN EGYPT, ALGERIA, AND TURKEY 72 (2007) (depicting 
Ibrahim’s charge and prosecution). 
 184. See id. (describing Ibrahim’s election rights work).  
 185. See id. (detailing the various politically motivated charges against 
Ibrahim).  
 186. See id. (noting an uptick in arrests against anyone opposing the regime).  
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ordinary and military courts.187 In detention, many were subjected 
to abuse and torture.188 
Egypt’s human rights violations are no secret. Much has been 
written about authoritarianism in the Middle East and failed 
attempts both by domestic and international actors to democratize 
the region and hold Middle Eastern regimes to their human rights 
commitments.189 These failures are partly due to Western nations’ 
continuation of foreign aid to dictators notwithstanding stated 
human rights conditions on aid, including $41 billion to Egypt in 
security-related assistance since 1979.190  
Rather than focus on how the U.S. facilitates human rights 
violations abroad, I now turn to America’s counterterrorism laws, 
policies and practices to demonstrate how counterterrorism 
coordination may have contributed to authoritarian norms and 
practices in the Middle East infecting U.S. counterterrorism 
practices. The systematic use of torture in secret black sites and at 
Guantanamo prison, inhumane conditions of detention, mass 
surveillance, and selective enforcement of counterterrorism 
against Muslim political dissidents are troublingly similar to 
Egypt’s authoritarian practices, as is the justification for rights 
violations—national security.191  
                                                                                                     
 187. See id. (detailing that charges were brought in the interest of national 
security). 
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C. The Authoritarianization Effect on United States 
Counterterrorism 
Although much ink has been spilled critiquing the United 
States’ human rights violations abroad and civil liberties 
infringements at home since 9/11, little is written on the 
relationship between United States-Middle East counterterrorism 
coordination and rights infringements in the United States.192 In 
the years immediately following the September 11th terrorist 
attacks, two themes predominated U.S. rhetoric on national 
security. First, the United States would do whatever was 
necessary to bring to justice the perpetrators of the September 
11th attacks in the “Global War on Terror.”193 This entailed 
working with dictators in the Middle East as partners to fight a 
war on terrorism.194 Second, the United States would promote 
democracy in the Middle East and South Asia to eliminate the 
repressive political conditions that some believed spawned 
terrorism.195 This neoconservative agenda was a remnant of the 
United States’ Cold War global politics.196 The contradiction 
                                                                                                     
methods noting that the United States conducts detention and surveillance in the 
interest of national security). 
 192. Some readers may mistakenly interpret my thesis as perpetuating 
Orientalism by implying that the Middle East is hopelessly authoritarian and 
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so-called “War on Terror.”  
 193. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 86, at iii (noting that the United 
States must be prepared for a long campaign against terrorism).  
 194. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 108, at 4 (“U.S. efforts 
with partners are central to achieving our [counterterrorism] goals, and we are 
committed to building security partnerships even as we recognize and work to 
improve shortfalls in our cooperation with partner nations.”). 
 195. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 4 
(2002) (“We will speak out honestly about violations of the nonnegotiable 
demands of human dignity using our voice and vote in international institutions 
to advance freedom.”). 
 196. See generally CONDOLEEZZA RICE, DEMOCRACY: STORIES FROM THE LONG 
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between a war model and democracy promotion for countering 
terrorism was glaring.  
On the one hand, President Bush wanted unfettered discretion 
to do whatever he deemed necessary, including torture and 
assassination, to fight an open-ended war against an ambiguously 
defined enemy. On the other hand, he wanted to promote 
democracy and strengthen civil society in Muslim majority 
countries where international terrorists recruited and set up 
bases.197 Obama continued his predecessor’s militarized 
counterterrorism practices but paid more rhetorical homage to 
human rights as he dropped the use of “War on Terror” in official 
U.S. documents.198 While the importance of democratic and 
representative governance was recognized in multiple U.S. 
National Security Strategy documents under Obama, his 
Administration deprioritized democracy promotion programs.199 
The result was a schizophrenic flip-flopping between the 
development and ideological schools of thought in 
counterterrorism. 
1. Rights Promoting Rhetoric 
Both the Bush and Obama Administrations rhetorically 
promoted human rights, civil rights, and civil liberties in 
counterterrorism strategy. On multiple occasions, Bush stated 
America was not at war with Islam.200 Bush’s 2006 National 
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NEWS & WORLD REP. (May 23, 2013, 3:30 PM), https://www.usnews.com/ 
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with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 199. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 
35– 36 (2010) (stating that America would not impose any system of government 
on another country); Byman & Moller, supra note 48, at 281–82 (listing the 
reasons for the failure of the U.S. democracy promotion agenda). 
 200. See Backgrounder: The President’s Quotes on Islam, THE WHITE HOUSE, 
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/ramadan/islam.html (last 
visited Sept. 10, 2018) (documenting President Bush’s remarks on Islam) (on file 
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Security Strategy states “[n]ot only do we fight our terrorist 
enemies on the battlefield, we promote freedom and human dignity 
as alternatives to the terrorists’ perverse vision of oppression and 
totalitarian rule.”201 The ultimate goal of the War on Terror is “to 
help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can 
meet the needs of their citizens . . . this is the best way to provide 
enduring security for the American people . . . for the misrule of 
tyrants at home leads to instability abroad.”202 Likewise, Obama 
began his first term with a historic speech in Cairo where he 
declared that the war on terrorism is not a war on Islam and “no 
system of government can or should be imposed on one nation by 
another.”203  
To fight the War on Terror, however, the United States needed 
cooperation from Middle Eastern governments—all of which were 
authoritarian to varying degrees.204 Both the Bush and Obama 
Administrations sought to expand international partnerships in 
U.S. counterterrorism efforts. In its priority to defeat Al Qaeda and 
then ISIS, the United States committed to “underwrite global 
security— through our commitments to allies, partners, and 
institutions.”205 But the U.S. government knew that an 
authoritarian regime would not share intelligence, provide sites for 
extraordinary rendition, torture U.S. terrorist suspects, accept 
U.S. military bases, and otherwise assist in the War on Terror if 
its existence was threatened by democratization programs.206 The 
                                                                                                     
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 201. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATTING 
TERRORISM 1 (2006). 
 202. Id. In furtherance of this policy, the Bush Administration committed 
funds for economic assistance, development aid, trade, and good governance in 
the Millennium Challenge that rewards countries with demonstrated democratic 
reforms. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 21–22 
(2002). 
 203. See President Barack Obama, Speech at Cairo University: A New 
Beginning (June 4, 2009) (“In Ankara, I made clear that America is not—and 
never will be—at war with Islam.”).  
 204. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 24 
(2010) (noting the need for cooperation with Israel, Iraq, and the Palestinian 
people). 
 205. Id. at 1. 
 206. See BYMAN, supra note 18, at 53–54 (noting that the U.S. depended on 
these regimes for critical counterterrorism operations). 
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regimes gladly took the military and economic aid without making 
serious efforts to liberalize their political systems.207 By the end of 
Obama’s Administration, the United States’ promotion of 
democracy was no longer taken seriously. 
At the same time the United States stated its adherence to 
“respecting human rights, fostering good governance, respecting 
privacy and civil liberties, committing to security and 
transparency, and upholding the rule of law,” its Middle East 
partners received billions of dollars in military weapons, 
sometimes used against their own citizens.208 The 2015 National 
Security Strategy admitted that despite America’s vision for a 
peaceful and prosperous Middle East, “nowhere is the violence 
more tragic and destabilizing than in the sectarian conflict from 
Beirut to Baghdad, which has given rise to new terrorist groups 
such as ISIL.”209 Many of the laws and practices authorized under 
Bush continued under Obama.210 The increased coordination 
between nations resulted in direct U.S. involvement in human 
rights violations, including against its own citizens.211  
The contradictions between rights infringing practices and 
rhetorical commitments to democracy and human rights 
discredited the United States both internationally and 
domestically.212 The United States had compromised its fidelity to 
international human rights norms.213 
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2. The Normalization of Torture and Indefinite Detention 
The divergence between rights-supporting rhetoric and 
rights-infringing practices is due in large part to the adoption of 
the war model to counterterrorism—the same template 
historically adopted by authoritarian Middle East regimes.214 One 
Department of Justice (DOJ) official forthrightly stated, “The 
United States cannot afford to retreat to a pre-September 11 
mindset that treats terrorism solely as a domestic law enforcement 
problem.”215 Consequently, terrorism is treated as an act of war 
rather than a criminal act.216 By claiming the nation is facing an 
existential threat, the government justifies military and police 
actions that systemically violate human rights.217 It also accepts 
theories that terrorism is caused by ideology as opposed to 
socioeconomic underdevelopment and material deprivation.218  
The counterterrorism war model blurs the line between police 
and military functions. Targets are unlawful combatants instead 
of criminal suspects.219 Due process rights afforded in ordinary 
criminal procedures do not apply.220 Executive authorities resist 
judicial review of surveillance, investigative techniques, and 
interrogation. Selective targeting of suspects is infected by 
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stereotypes and prejudice against groups deemed collectively 
dangerous merely because they share the same religion or ideology 
as suspected terrorists.221  
The war model also grants the executive branch an 
open-ended mandate to fight whomever is deemed an enemy of the 
state.222 If left unchecked, such powers can be unleashed against 
political dissidents and opposition under the guise of national 
security.223 Torture is legalized and systemic, civilians are tried in 
military courts, ordinary criminal offenses are prosecuted as 
terrorism, and infringements on civil liberties become the 
norm— as is the case in Egypt and other authoritarian allies.224 
Ultimately, the rule of law is undermined. 
The proliferation of black site detention centers and rampant 
torture are among the gravest consequences of U.S. 
counterterrorism. In violation of the Convention on Enforced 
Disappearances, the Convention Against Torture, the universal 
human right to personal liberty, and the prohibition of arbitrary 
arrest and detention, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and its 
foreign counterparts covertly abducted individuals to secret 
locations in the Middle East, North Africa, and other countries 
where torture has long been a standard practice.225 Hundreds of 
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approach to terrorism). See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “NO BLOOD, NO 
FOUL”: SOLDIERS’ ACCOUNTS OF DETAINEE ABUSE IN IRAQ (2006).  
 225. See Setty, supra note 2, at 653 (detailing that post 9/11, the CIA set up a 
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individuals, predominantly of Arab and Central Asian origin, were 
extra-judicially delivered to interrogators in Egypt, Jordan, Syria, 
and other countries where detainees were systematically abused 
and tortured.226  
The extraordinary rendition program was a complex and 
coordinated program between the United States and its foreign 
allies, authorized at the highest level of the Bush 
Administration.227 According to UK parliamentary reports, over 
twenty countries participated in the rendition program.228 Some 
directly participated in torture while others provided airports, 
airspace, and military bases for staging and stopover flights 
carrying detainees.229 Victims of extraordinary rendition were not 
limited to citizens of Middle Eastern countries, but also included 
Canadian, German, and American citizens, most of whom were 
Muslim.230 Children as young as thirteen and adults as old as 
eighty-four were among those detained and tortured.231 
After years of denial, investigative journalism forced the Bush 
Administration to confirm extraordinary rendition was occurring. 
But instead of stopping the program, the Administration legalized 
torture by renaming it “enhanced interrogation,” and proclaiming 
national security justified the practice.232 Government officials 
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 228. See generally Intelligence and Security Committee, Rendition (2007). 
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and Syria. See Duffy, supra note 13, at 786–87. 
 230. See DUFFY, supra note 13, at 670–71 (detailing the wide reach of the 
rendition program). 
 231. See generally id.  
 232. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. 
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pointed to legal memos issued in 2002 and 2003 by the Office of 
Legal Counsel at the U.S. Department of Justice advising that 
individuals suspected of membership in Al Qaeda are not protected 
by international law, including prohibitions against torture.233 
Even if they were protected, the DOJ argued, only treatment that 
caused “injury so severe that death, organ failure, or permanent 
damage resulting in a loss of significant bodily function” met the 
U.S. legal threshold for torture.234 
As a result, approved interrogation techniques included  
[W]hipping by the neck into concrete walls; chaining to a chair 
for a period of weeks; the use of the ‘box’, including forcing into 
a small box for up to eighteen hours; stripping and hanging 
naked from the ceiling; sleep deprivation, including keeping 
detainees awake for eleven consecutive days; exposure to 
extreme noise; exposure to cold until the victim turned blue; 
denial of pain medication for injuries; waterboarding or 
simulated drowning; and threats of imminent death.235 
Conditions of detention were equally severe. Detainees were 
hooded to disorient them and to keep them from learning their 
location or the layout of the detention facility; shackled to chairs; 
placed in solitary confinement for years; and subjected to 
continuous noise and light.236 Detainees were cramped in small 
unsanitary rooms and subjected to extreme heat.237 Such 
treatment was legally justified by necessity and self-defense.238  
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The torture and abuse of detainees in the United States’ 
extraordinary rendition program was systemic and unprecedented. 
Some individuals were detained in secret locations for three or 
more years incommunicado.239 Many were subjected to 
waterboarding, including as frequently as a hundred times in a 
single month.240 Others were interrogated for eighteen to twenty 
hours a day for more than fifty consecutive days.241 One Ethiopian 
citizen was detained for over a year and a half during which his 
interrogators repeatedly sliced his genitals with razor blades and 
poured stinging hot liquid on his open wounds.242 A Canadian 
citizen of Syrian origin, Maher Arar, was mistakenly suspected of 
ties with terrorists, arrested by U.S. officials in transit home to 
Canada, and sent to Syria where he endured prolonged torture and 
other brutal forms of interrogation.243  
After weeks, months, or years of secret coercive interrogation, 
when interrogators determined there was no intelligence value in 
a detainee, he was sent to Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib, and 
other prisons where torture was commonplace.244 In Abu Ghraib, 
U.S. military and intelligence officials systematically subjected 
detainees to physical and sexual abuse, torture, rape, sodomy, and 
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murder.245 The few detainees set free were denied reparation or a 
public apology.246  
When news broke in 2004 of widespread torture at the hands 
of U.S. intelligence and military officials, Americans were 
surprised to learn that the White House and DOJ authorized the 
torture. Pressure mounted on Congress to pass the Detainee 
Treatment Act of 2005 that prohibited abuse and torture of 
detainees.247 In 2009, President Obama issued an executive order 
banning “enhanced interrogation techniques” and limited 
interrogation techniques to those authorized under the Army Field 
Memo.248 The Military Commissions Act of 2009 and Defense 
Authorization Bill of 2015 legislated the order into law.249  
In contrast to Middle East authoritarian countries, the United 
States has a vibrant civil society and cadre of independent 
investigative journalists. As a result, the nation’s drift toward 
authoritarianism was structurally constrained by a group of 
courageous lawyers, activists, and journalists.250 Nevertheless, the 
U.S. War on Terror contributed to the normalization of torture. 
Indeed, lawyers from the most elite law schools manipulated 
interpretations of the law to legalize torture.251 that no high-level 
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official involved in the torture program has been prosecuted is 
further proof that torture is an acceptable national security 
practice under certain circumstances.252 Indeed, should there be 
another major terrorist attack on U.S. soil, the Trump 
Administration admitted that torture is an option it would 
consider.253  
Along with torture came indefinite detention. Hundreds of 
detainees from black sites were transferred to Guantanamo Bay, 
Abu Ghraib, and Bagram Air Base where they were denied basic 
due process rights in violation of the 1949 Geneva Convention, 
among other laws.254 In Guantanamo Bay, where most detainees 
suspected of being associated with Al Qaeda were sent, the Bush 
Administration intentionally sought to evade legal protections 
afforded by U.S. and international human rights laws by labeling 
them “unlawful enemy combatants.”255  
A Presidential Military Order authorizing indefinite detention 
declared that  
[T]he individual shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or 
maintain any proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have any 
such remedy or proceeding sought on the individual’s behalf, in 
(i) any court of the United States, or any State thereof, (ii) any 
court of any foreign nation, or (iii) any international tribunal.256  
Labeled “enemy combatants” based on secret evidence, the 
detainees were denied access to lawyers or their families, and could 
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not petition for independent review of their detention.257 To protest 
their indefinite detention, prisoners attempted to commit suicide 
and undertook in months-long hunger strikes.258  
Without investigative reporting followed by years of 
contentious litigation that reached the U.S. Supreme Court, this 
system of indefinite detention in a lawless zone could have 
remained secret and unchecked.259 In a series of cases starting in 
2004, the Supreme Court held that U.S. citizens designated as 
unlawful enemy combatants by the executive branch still had a 
right for their detention to be challenged before a neutral 
arbiter.260 Justice O’Connor warned the executive branch that 
“[w]e have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank 
check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s 
citizens.”261 The Court also held that non-U.S. citizens held in 
Guantanamo Bay had a right to habeas corpus where they could 
challenge their detention before regular Article III courts.262 In 
response, the United States sent captured detainees to Bagram Air 
Force Base outside of U.S. courts’ jurisdiction.263 
The limited due process afforded by habeas petitions revealed 
many detainees were innocent victims of local bounty hunters.264 
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Contrary to U.S. government claims, many detainees were 
civilians kidnapped by local warlords in Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
and Iraq to be delivered to the U.S. military in exchange for a 
bounty.265 Never having posed a threat to the United States, they 
lost years of their lives and suffered severe mental and physical 
health problems due to torture and prolonged detention.266 Those 
who filed human rights claims in U.S. courts were impeded by the 
state secret privilege, which granted the executive immunity for 
violating international law.267  
After years of advocacy and revelations of a pattern of human 
rights violations, the Obama Administration finally announced it 
would close the Guantanamo Bay prison and prosecute detainees 
in U.S. federal courts.268 But congressional leaders obstructed 
these efforts by passing a law prohibiting any detainee transfers 
to U.S. soil, in part, because defendants’ access to due process 
might result in their acquittal.269 Over seventeen years after 
September 11th, Guantanamo Bay remains a destination for 
suspected terrorists captured abroad by U.S. officials seeking to 
evade international human rights law and U.S. domestic law.270 A 
practice that used to be considered within the realm of 
                                                                                                     
law through litigation and advocacy). 
 265. See, e.g., Egypt: 7,400 Civilians Tried in Military Court, supra note 150 
(documenting cases of systemic torture by the Egyptian security services). 
 266. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOCKED UP ALONE: DETENTION CONDITIONS 
AND MENTAL HEALTH AT GUANTANAMO 20 (2008) (reporting insomnia, 
hallucinations, and psychosis in detainees). 
 267. See Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 
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 268. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Plan to Close 
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authoritarian regimes has now become an openly American 
practice.271  
The authoritarianization of U.S. counterterrorism did not end 
with torture and indefinite detention abroad.272 At home, 
Americans’ civil liberties fall prey to the prying eyes of a 
burgeoning surveillance state.273  
3. Establishing a Surveillance State and Selective 
Counterterrorism Enforcement 
Technological advancements, the rise of international 
terrorism, and normalization of authoritarian practices prove 
ominous for domestic civil liberties.274 Gathering intelligence and 
mass surveillance to justify ex ante, pre-crime objectives became 
bureaucratized in what Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson call the 
“National Surveillance State.”275 Multiple covert programs collect 
information from a wide range of government and private 
databases to produce mammoth amounts of personal data at the 
fingertips of law enforcement.276  
Soon after the 9/11 attacks, the Bush Administration secretly 
authorized a program known as Total Information Awareness 
(TIA).277 The program collected information from government and 
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private databases about Americans’ transactions, and then applied 
algorithms to the data as a means of identifying terrorist 
patterns.278 This form of predictive policing looked at financial, 
educational, travel, medical, housing, and other transactions to 
target individuals as potential terrorists.279 Rather than focusing 
on individualized suspicion or predicate acts of terrorism, the 
government adopted a risk-assessment model.280 People deemed to 
be of higher risk levels would then be targeted for investigation 
and prosecution.281 Applying the ideological causation theory, the 
risk criteria were closely associated with religious beliefs, 
associations, and political activities of Muslims and Arabs. 282 
Traveling to the Middle East, transferring money to family 
abroad, donating to Muslim charities, associating with people from 
the Middle East, studying Arabic, doing business with other 
Muslims, and regularly attending mosques also triggered 
government suspicion and surveillance.283 As these minority 
groups become increasingly scrutinized by the state, stereotypes of 
the Muslim terrorist that animate government surveillance are 
reinforced and intensified against Muslim communities.284 The 
predictive, risk-assessment model facilitates racial and religious 
profiling of Muslims and Arabs based on an interpretation of 
ordinary activities as ideologically associated with Islam.285  
Although public and congressional pushback ultimately ended 
the TIA, the Bush Administration secretly authorized another 
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version of the program wherein the National Security Agency spied 
on people in the United States, including American citizens, who 
communicated with persons outside the country.286 Without a court 
order, the NSA secretly intercepted tens of millions of telephone 
calls and emails and stored them in massive databases.287 
Breaking from the standard law enforcement practice of long term 
monitoring of select individuals based on individualized suspicion, 
the U.S. government was now collecting massive amounts of data 
on hundreds of thousands of individuals that could be mined at any 
time.288 Although the contents of the conversations were not 
retained, the metadata collected—e.g., time, location, duration, to 
and from phone numbers and emails—gave the government a 
window into a person’s activities and associations.289 
Another program, PRISM, gathered contents of 
communications from non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be 
abroad even if the communication includes a U.S. citizen.290 
Although these searches require a warrant from the secret Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court, these broad warrants do not 
identify the people or places searched or impose meaningful 
restrictions on the collection, retention, or dissemination of the 
foreign intelligence obtained.291  
When the New York Times broke the story about these mass 
surveillance programs, the Bush Administration pointed to the 
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Patriot Act as authorizing its secret collection programs.292 A 
300-page law hurriedly passed within forty-five days of the 
September 11th attacks, the Patriot Act legalized expansive 
government surveillance and investigative powers.293 Legal 
standards restricting searches of email and telephone 
communications were relaxed, as was government access to 
medical, financial, and other personal records.294 For example, the 
legal standard for obtaining a wiretap related to foreign 
intelligence was loosened from probable cause of a crime to mere 
relevancy to terrorism prevention.295 FISA warrants no longer had 
to show that the primary purpose of the pertinent investigation 
was to collect foreign intelligence, merely a significant purpose.296 
Meanwhile, courts regularly deferred to FBI agents’ lax definitions 
of significant purpose and relevancy.297 
The relaxed standards likely contributed to the increased 
number of FISA orders from 934 in 2001 to 2,370 in 2007.298 The 
Patriot Act also authorized law enforcement officials to apply for 
roving wiretaps on any communication service provider without 
geographical limitations or naming the target.299 Pen registers and 
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trap and trace orders applied anywhere in the United States rather 
than within the jurisdiction of the ordering court.300 Sneak and 
peak searches allowed law enforcement to conduct searches 
without notice to the target.301  
Secret warrants from a secret court permit federal authorities 
to investigate U.S. citizens and residents based on factors 
tangentially related to national security. Thus, warrants 
authorized under Section 215 of the Patriot Act were especially 
problematic.302 The type of information that could be obtained 
expanded to “any tangible thing” on persons who were not 
necessarily under suspicion for involvement in terrorism or 
espionage.303 Information sought included library records, which 
resulted in librarians across the country being served with Section 
215 warrants and national security letters seeking the internet 
and reading lists of patrons.304 Gag orders barred the librarians 
from challenging or disclosing the requests for facially First 
Amendment protected activity.305 Enlisting librarians in 
counterterrorism was part of a broader system of delegating 
intelligence collection to private and public local actors.   
Deputizing citizens to spy on each other is another powerful 
tool of authoritarian regimes for instilling fear and paranoia 
among their citizens. 306 In the United States, state and local police 
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manage state fusion centers that produce suspicious activity 
reports with minimal oversight.307 The private sector assists 
government intelligence collection through suspicious activity 
reporting. In 2002, the Bush Administration initiated the 
Terrorism Information and Prevention System (TIPS) wherein 
truck drivers, utility workers, cable guys, banks, and other 
businesses would report suspicious activity.308 TIPS invited racial 
and ethnic profiling as citizens reported Muslims praying, wearing 
headscarves, donning bears, and engaging in other religious 
activities as suspicious terrorist activity.309 Consequently, the 
number of suspicious activity reports skyrocketed from 
approximately 163,000 in 2000 to 1.25 million in 2007.310 Banks 
were also required to collect more information about their 
customers, share it with the government, and err on the side of 
inclusivity in submitting reports of suspicious transactions.311 
Predictably, customers with family and businesses in the Middle 
East and North Africa found themselves targets of heightened 
bank scrutiny that led to sudden bank account closures, refusal of 
service, and surprise visits by law enforcement.312  
The most widely used method of government surveillance has 
become the National Security Letter (NSL), an administrative 
subpoena issued by the FBI to private entities for information 
about their customers.313 No longer must the FBI show specific and 
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articulable facts that the target was a foreign power or agent of a 
foreign power.314 Instead, the Patriot Act relaxes the standard to 
mere relevance to a national security investigation.315 Because 
NSLs are subpoenas, no court order is required prior to issuing 
them.316 
Unsurprisingly, issuance of NSLs surged. By 2006, the FBI 
issued nearly 50,000 NSL requests to car rental companies, banks, 
casinos, internet service providers, Google, Facebook, financial 
institutions, libraries, and other businesses as compared to 8,500 
in 2000.317 The DOJ Inspector General found that over 60% of 
NSLs reviewed violated FBI internal controls and 22% violated 
internal reporting requirements resulting in at least 3,000 
violations.318 
Most troublingly, the line between the FBI’s domestic 
surveillance powers and the CIA’s international surveillance 
powers is blurred.319 The CIA has had access to vast amounts of 
personal information gathered by the FBI.320 Under the guise of 
information sharing, the U.S. regressed back to an era when the 
FBI and CIA engaged in egregious rights violations under the 
infamous COINTELPRO of the 1960s and 1970s.321 During this 
era, civil rights leaders, anti-war activists, and persons suspected 
of being Communists were spied on, investigated, and in some 
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cases, prosecuted.322 Tellingly, the FBI and CIA primarily targeted 
African Americans, Jews, or leftists whose ideology and race were 
deemed a threat to the state.323  
The same is happening in the post-9/11 era as Muslim 
students, businesses, mosques, and homes are subjected to 
intensive surveillance for no other reason than their religion or 
ethnic origin.324 Muslims are disproportionately on multiple watch 
lists containing hundreds of thousands of names.325 Ranging from 
No Fly Lists that preclude them from traveling by air altogether to 
Terrorist Screening Lists that subject them to secondary screening 
every time they travel, Muslims do not receive notice of their 
selection nor are they offered meaningful opportunity to be 
removed from these secret lists.326 Consequently, a large 
percentage of names are false positives due to incorrect or outdated 
information and mistaken identities.327 Over time, selective 
enforcement of counterterrorism laws produces a palpable chilling 
effect in Muslim American communities.328  
As authoritarian norms seep into governance, government 
scrutiny eventually shifts from politically vulnerable minorities 
that serve as convenient scapegoats to political dissidents and 
opposition groups.329 In a 2010 report, the Inspector General for 
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the United States Department of Justice found that the FBI had 
improperly targeted domestic advocacy groups for investigation 
solely on account of their First Amendment protected activities.330 
FBI agents secretly attended meetings, took pictures, and 
gathered intelligence about anti-war, animal rights, and 
anti-globalization meetings without a legitimate law enforcement 
purpose.331 Confidential informants infiltrated the organizations 
reporting back to the FBI on the organizations’ First Amendment 
protected activities.332  
V. Reversing the Race to the Bottom 
These negative domestic externalities of counterterrorism 
coordination are sufficiently serious that they can no longer be 
ignored. Not only have laws and practices changed, but also a 
culture of intolerance has arisen in American political culture.333 
The effects were glaringly evident during the 2016 presidential 
campaign. Republican candidates competed for who was most 
hawkish on national security and immigration, which manifested 
in scapegoating Muslims and equating Islam with terrorism.334  
Calls to keep America safe included registering all Muslims in 
the United States, barring Muslims from entering the country, and 
surveilling mosques under the presumption that they are hotbeds 
of terrorism.335 Government officials betrayed America’s historical 
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commitment to granting refuge to civilians victimized by war 
abroad as they called to ban Syrian refugees from entering the 
United States.336 Then-presidential candidate Trump condemned 
Syrian refugees as a collective security risk when he stated  
[W]hen the Syrian refugees are going to start pouring into this 
country, we don’t know if they’re ISIS, we don’t know if it’s a 
Trojan horse. And I definitely want a database and other checks 
and balances. We want to go with watch lists. We want to go 
with databases. And we have no choice.337  
The fear mongering and collective suspicion cast upon 
minorities led to changes in laws that jeopardized their rights.338 
In January 2017, for example, President Trump issued executive 
orders banning citizens from seven Muslim majority countries 
from entering the United States and indefinitely barring Syrian 
refugees many of who were victims of terrorism themselves.339 
When Acting Attorney General Sallie Yates refused to enforce the 
ban on grounds that it was unconstitutional, Trump immediately 
fired her.340 Similarly, Trump fired FBI Director James Comey 
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when he refused to pledge absolute loyalty to the president.341 
Removing civil servants who do not blindly obey the president is a 
frequent occurrence in authoritarian regimes.342  
 Just as the United States does not negotiate with terrorists, 
neither should it coordinate counterterrorism operations with 
state human rights violators. That Middle Eastern regimes’ 
authoritarian rights-infringing practices have made the region 
more, not less, susceptible to terrorist violence should further 
caution Western nations adopting similar practices.343 Indeed, the 
region has the highest concentration of transnational terrorist 
attacks causing over tens of thousands of civilians killed over the 
past four decades.344 
Financial restraints should be imposed on federal agencies 
who coordinate with counterparts who violate rights in 
counterterrorism. The United States has established the 
promotion of internationally recognized human rights as a 
component of its foreign policy.345 Toward that end, a pair of 
amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the 
National Defense Authorization Act, also known as the Leahy 
Laws, prohibit the State and Defense Departments from giving 
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foreign aid to any unit of a security or military force of a foreign 
country if that unit has committed gross human rights 
violations.346 Financial restraints should be imposed on federal 
agencies that coordinate with counterparts who violate rights in 
counterterrorism. 
Gross human rights are defined as including “torture or cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged 
detention without charges and trial, causing the disappearance of 
persons by abduction and clandestine detention of those persons, 
and other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security 
of person.”347 Such conditions are intended to incentivize and deter 
foreign security forces from committing human rights violations.348 
With the increase in coordination in counterterrorism operations 
between the U.S. and foreign security forces, such conditions 
should not be limited to the behavior of foreign security forces. U.S. 
security and intelligence officials must also be held accountable. 
One way to do so is through budgetary and policy restraints. 
Funding of government security agencies’ coordination or 
cooperation with their foreign counterparts should be conditional 
on their adherence to domestic civil rights and constitutional law 
as well as international human rights law. While the means in 
which such conditions can be incorporated into law is a separate 
project beyond the scope of this Article, I proffer the following 
conceptual framework: (1) reporting on counterterrorism 
coordination; (2) monitoring of coordination to ensure U.S. officials 
are not participating directly or indirectly in human rights 
violations; and (3) conditioning funding of government agencies 
engaged in transnational counterterrorism coordination. As the 
overarching coordinator of intelligence and national security 
                                                                                                     
 346. See Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 § 620M, 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (2012); Carl 
Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-291, § 1204(a)(1), 128 Stat. 3292, 3531 (2015). 
 347. 1961 Foreign Assistance Act § 116. Extrajudicial killing and politically 
motivated rape are also included in this definition. See U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, SECURITY ASSISTANCE 9 (2016).  
 348. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 347, at 8 (discussing 
that the Leahy Laws prevent U.S. assistance to human rights violators). 
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operations, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
(ODNI) is a potential candidate as the implementing authority.349 
First, agencies would be required to submit an annual report 
to the ODNI about their counterterrorism coordination with 
foreign governments in which they demonstrate that they are not 
cooperating with counterparts that violate human rights.350 For 
instance, when Afghan police and military units abuse and torture 
detainees, the United States should not be cooperating with such 
units, much less funding them.351 The same applies for FBI and 
CIA agents or DOJ lawyers who work with foreign intelligence and 
anti-terrorism counterparts.352 Not only do such restrictions 
prevent violations against civilians abroad, but they also prevent 
the long-term exposure of U.S. counterterrorism personnel to 
authoritarian practices permissible under the foreign countries’ 
laws and policies. Such exposure contributes toward normalizing 
these human rights violations within the American national 
security community.  
Second, the ODNI would monitor U.S. counterterrorism 
coordination through review of the reports and auditing processes 
to ensure compliance. The ODNI would have a similar role in 
counterterrorism coordination human rights compliance as the 
                                                                                                     
 349. See Who We Are, OFF. DIR. NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, 
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/who-we-are (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (stating 
that the ODNI serves as the head of the U.S. intelligence community) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 350. The agencies subject to this process should include the Department of 
Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, the Department of 
Justice, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Treasury, and the 
National Security Agency.   
 351. See Jeremy Kelly, US-Backed Afghan Militias Accused of Human Rights 
Abuses, GUARDIAN (Sept. 12, 2011, 3:53 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2011/sep/12/us-backed-afghan-militias-abuses (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) 
(reporting U.S. support for the Afghan Local Police) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 352. See ‘We Left Our Most Important Prisoners To Amateurs’, SPIEGEL 
ONLINE (Jan. 23, 2015, 4:06 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/ 
former-fbi-official-ali-soufan-condemns-guantanamo-torture-a-1014475.html 
(last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (providing an interview with former FBI agent Ali 
Soufan, which discusses the CIA using torture techniques after 9/11) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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State Department in enforcing compliance with the Leahy Laws in 
the foreign aid context.353  
Third, should an agency be found out of compliance, funding 
for counterterrorism coordination should be suspended until the 
agency takes effective measures to bring itself into compliance.354 
This may include repealing memorandums of understanding for 
cooperation with foreign units, cancellation of training programs, 
and providing additional training to U.S. personnel on U.S. law 
and international human rights law. Corrective measures for 
noncompliance should be adopted with the goal of preventing 
short-term human rights and civil rights violations and 
longer-term compliance through a culture of democracy and 
respect for individual rights.355  
To be sure, implementation of human and civil rights 
conditions will not be free of challenges.356 Information about U.S. 
partners’ counterterrorism efforts may not always be available to 
U.S. officials. Nor will documentation always be available to prove 
U.S. compliance. Because what constitutes a violation must be 
clearly defined and consistently applied, the proposed framework 
                                                                                                     
 353. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 347, at 10 (describing 
the process in the State Department that monitors compliance with the Leahy 
Laws). 
 354. This proposal is taken from the language in the Leahy amendment 
stating: 
No assistance shall be furnished under this Act or the Arms Export 
Control Act to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the 
Secretary of State has credible evidence that such unit has committed 
gross violations of human rights. The prohibition in subsection (a) shall 
not apply if the Secretary determines and reports to the Committee on 
Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 
the House of Representatives, and the Committees on Appropriations 
that the government of such country is taking effective measures to 
bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to justice. 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 § 620(j), 22 U.S.C. § 2378(d) (2012). 
 355. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF GOOD POLICING: AVOIDING 
VIOLENCE BETWEEN POLICE AND CITIZENS 23 (2003) (discussing the role of law 
enforcement culture in promoting rights compliance among the police). 
 356. See Andrew M. Leonard, Getting the Leahy Law Right, FOREIGN AFF. 
(June 29, 2017), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-06-29/getting-
leahy-law-right (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (highlighting the flaws with 
implementation of the Leahy law) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
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requires an iterative and inclusive process wherein the various 
affected agencies participate in the process.  
VI. Conclusion 
The authoritarianization of U.S. counterterrorism spans 
multiple administrations in the post-9/11 era. At the same time 
that Western nations focus on the democratization of Muslim 
majority countries, citizens in the West experience attrition in 
their civil liberties.357 “Hard on terror” approaches where the 
rulebook is figuratively thrown out the window are mistaken for 
“smart” national security measures.358 National security is used to 
justify rights violations, emergency law, prosecutions, and military 
trials of civilians.  
Those advocating for a development approach to terrorism 
prevention are dismissed as naïve.359 Human rights and individual 
freedoms are characterized as a luxury the West cannot afford to 
preserve in the face of a transnational terrorist threat.360 These are 
the same views long held by Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes 
mired in political instability.  
Although transnational counterterrorism is necessary for the 
security of both West and Middle Eastern nations, the exchange of 
information, skills, and strategy may be contributing towards a 
normalization of illiberal practices among U.S. officials. Countries 
such as Egypt with a higher rate of terrorism become the experts 
advising their U.S. counterparts that violence and brutality is the 
only effective means of preventing terrorism. Consequently, a 
cultural transformation occurs within the U.S. law enforcement 
and intelligence community that subordinates rights—particularly 
                                                                                                     
 357. See Piazza & Walsh, supra note 15, at 129 (noting that Western countries 
face diminishing civil liberties).   
 358. See, e.g., Daniel L. Byman, Trump and the Next Terrorist Attack, 
BROOKINGS (May 3, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/05/03/trump-
and-the-next-terrorist-attack/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) (arguing that harsh 
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the relevance of international human rights law in the war on terror). 
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of groups with the same religious or racial identity of the 
terrorists—to militarized counterterrorism practices. 
Although evidence of a causal link between rights violations 
and counterterrorism coordination is far from conclusive, the 
United States’ post-9/11 national security practices troublingly 
mirror those frequently found in authoritarian states. Abuse of 
detainees, torture, indefinite detention, mass surveillance, secret 
courts, selective enforcement of criminal and immigration law 
based on race and religion, and extrajudicial killings are some 
obvious examples. The acculturation of American security officials 
into an authoritarian, militaristic approach is more insidious and 
rights infringing over the long run. As such, concrete 
accountability measures on federal security and intelligence 
agencies coordinating with their foreign counterparts shields the 
United States from meandering down the slippery slope that leads 
to authoritarianism. For once a nation surpasses the tipping point, 
reversing course may be insurmountable.361  
                                                                                                     
 361. See generally Sahar F. Aziz, Bringing Down an Uprising: Egypt’s 
Stillborn Revolution, 30 CONN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2014) (examining why the attempt to 
remove an authoritarian regime proved to be insurmountable for Egyptians, 
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